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TRADE SECRETS AND THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION: A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF E.U. AND U.S. APPROACHES TO 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND WHISTLEBLOWING 
Sharon K. Sandeen* and Ulla-Maija Mylly+ 
In this so-called “information age,” when numerous 
companies are collecting and creating more and more data and 
information, it is important to consider how the interests of these 
companies can (and should) be reconciled with the public’s 
interests in information, or what the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights labels the “right to information.” Having expended 
money to create their stores of information, these companies often 
claim the need to protect it from all “unauthorized” uses, but our 
laws have never gone so far. To the contrary, information is not 
protected unless the law says it is, and when it is protected the 
scope of protection is usually limited. Thus, there is an information 
dichotomy that courts should consider; on one hand various laws 
seek to protect certain types of information, while other laws and 
legal principles are designed to promote the expression and 
diffusion of information. 
Sometimes the information dichotomy is reflected in the laws 
themselves which often limit the scope of protectable information 
and explicitly allow certain uses of information. Other times, or in 
addition, the dichotomy is reflected in the application of ancillary 
principles of law which, in effect, serve as additional limitations on 
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the scope of protection. This article examines the information 
dichotomy of trade secret law in the United States and the 
European Union, focusing on two ancillary principles of law: 
freedom of expression and whistleblowing. The central premise of 
the article is that the public policy favoring information diffusion is 
the rule and trade secret protection is an exception. Seen through 
this prism, it is important for courts to consider the public’s 
interest in free expression and whistleblowing in all trade secret 
cases. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
There is an information dichotomy that exists in law, 
particularly with respect to trade secret laws, including the 
European Union’s (E.U.) directive on the protection of undisclosed 
know-how and business information (trade secrets) against their 
unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure (the “Trade Secret 
Directive”).1 The dichotomy is between: (1) the strong public 
policy in the United States (U.S.), the E.U., and elsewhere that 
favors and encourages the creation and dissemination of 
information and knowledge; and (2) laws, such as the Trade Secret 
Directive, that enable individuals and businesses to protect certain 
categories of information from acquisition, use, or disclosure by 
others. As with intellectual property (IP) laws more generally, the 
theory underlying trade secret protection is that society gets 
something that is of greater benefit than the advantages that flow 
from information diffusion and free competition. In the case of 
trade secrets, this includes the prevention of unfair competition and 
additional incentives for invention and creation over and above 
what is provided by patent and copyright laws. 
Much has been written about trade secret law and policy from 
the protection side of the information dichotomy, with those who 
favor strong trade secret protection touting the economic benefits 
that they believe follow from the protection of trade secrets. Much 
less has been written about the information diffusion side of the 
dichotomy,2 particularly as it relates to the human right (and need) 
 
 1 Directive 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 
2016 on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business information 
(trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure, 2016 O.J. 
(L 157) 1 [hereinafter “Trade Secret Directive”]. 
 2 Previous works that have explored the tension between trade secret law and 
the U.S. First Amendment include: Pamela Samuelson, Principles for Resolving 
Conflicts Between Trade Secrets and the First Amendment, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 
777 (2007) and Adam W. Johnson, Injunctive Relief in the Internet Age: The 
Battle Between Free Speech and Trade Secrets, 54 FED. COMM. L.J. 517 (2002), 
which heavily relied upon and cited Ryan Lambrecht, Trade Secrets and the 
Internet: What Remedies Exist for Disclosure in the Information Age?, 18 REV. 
LITIG. 317 (1999). For an examination of freedom of expression issues with 
respect to other types of information law, see, e.g, Tun-Jen Chiang, Patents and 
Free Speech, 107 GEO. L.J. 309, 311 (2019); Dan L. Burk, Patents and the First 
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to “seek, receive and impart information.”3 Yet information law 
principles in both the U.S. and E.U. are replete with statements of 
the critical role that information diffusion plays in the 
advancement of important social values, including democracy, 
innovation, and creativity. With respect to innovation, Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor explained that “[t]he efficient operation of 
the [U.S.] federal patent system depends upon substantially free 
trade in publicly known, unpatented design and utilitarian 
conceptions.”4 
Trade secret law is not insensitive to information diffusion 
concerns; both the U.S. and the E.U. have adopted rather similar 
limitations to trade secret protection that are designed to strike a 
balance between information protection and information diffusion. 
Additionally, in the Trade Secret Directive, the whistleblowing 
provision enables disclosures5 that serve the public interest, 
including revealing illegal activities and misconduct.6 Moreover, 
the Directive’s provision concerning freedom of speech safeguards 
 
Amendment, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 197 (2018); Lisa P. Ramsey, Increasing First 
Amendment Scrutiny of Trademark Law, 61 SMU L. REV. 381 (2008); 
Jacqueline Lipton, Information Property: Rights and Responsibilities, 56 FLA. L. 
REV. 135, 138 (2004); Eric B. Easton, Public Importance: Balancing 
Proprietary Interests and the Right to Know, 21 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 139 
(2003); Yochai Benkler, Free as Air to Common Use: First Amendment 
Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999); 
Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volkh, Freedom of Speech and Injunction in 
Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998). 
 3 See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 
1948) (“Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right 
includes the freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive 
and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of 
frontiers.”) (emphasis added). 
 4 Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 156 (1989). 
 5 A word about the use of the word “disclosure” when talking about trade 
secrets: The word “disclosure” in the trade secret context can have multiple 
meanings and effects, one of which is the act of making information known in a 
way that results in the loss of trade secrecy. Another is a synonym for sharing 
information, which does not necessarily result in the loss of trade secrecy. 
Unless otherwise indicated, we use the word “disclosure” throughout this article 
to mean the act of sharing information without making any claim as to the legal 
effect of such disclosure. 
 6 Trade Secret Directive, supra note 1, at Art. 5 (b). 
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media freedom and plurality in accordance with the E.U. Charter 
of Fundamental Rights (Charter).7 Quite similarly to the E.U., the 
U.S. has adopted a whistleblowing provision as part of the Defend 
Trade Secret Act of 2016 (DTSA) which, together with the U.S. 
Constitution, protects freedom of expression with impacts on trade 
secret protection in some contexts. However, what is missing from 
both U.S. law as expressed in the DTSA (and its state-analogue the 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA)) and E.U. law as expressed in 
the Trade Secret Directive is a clear statement of the purposes 
behind such limitations and exceptions and an explanation of how 
they are to be applied. Absent legislative direction, these are 
matters for courts to consider. 
The main objective of this article is to explore how the freedom 
of expression and whistleblower provisions of E.U. and U.S. law 
should be applied to further the right to information in the trade 
secret context, demonstrating the similarities and differences in 
E.U. and U.S. approaches in the process. It begins in Part II with a 
brief discussion of trade secret law and how E.U. and U.S. trade 
secret doctrine, when properly applied, promote information 
diffusion and reduce potential conflicts between the desire to 
protect trade secrets and the public’s interest in information. Next, 
Part III explains the right to information as expressed in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the legal 
principles of the E.U. and U.S., including the values and interests 
that underlie such right. 
Finally, Parts IV and V get to the heart of the analysis by 
examining the meaning and application of the right to information 
in two contexts that are addressed in both U.S. and E.U. trade 
secret law: freedom of expression and whistleblowing, 
respectively. Among other things, it explains how conflicts 
 
 7 See id. Art. 5 (a). The Charter belongs to the E.U.’s primary law having the 
same legal value as the E.U. Treaties. However, the Charter does not extend the 
competences of the European Union. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on 
European Union, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 13. For case law on the applicability of the 
Charter to E.U. Member State laws and measures, see in particular Case C-
617/10, Åklagaren v. Hans Åkerberg Fransson, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 
62010CJ0617 (Feb. 26, 2013). 
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between trade secret protection and the right to information can 
arise and identifies circumstances that should favor information 
diffusion over information lock-down; an inquiry that is becoming 
of greater importance as more and more information is digitized 
and put behind paywalls. The article concludes by summarizing the 
similarities and differences between E.U. and U.S. approaches to 
freedom of expression and whistleblowing, issues that are of great 
importance for democratic societies. 
In the E.U., the Trade Secret Directive’s national 
implementation period ended in summer 2018, whilst the 
Whistleblower Directive’s implementation period has not yet 
ended. Consequently, there is no case law on the interpretation of 
these specific provisions. Similarly, while the DTSA went into 
effect immediately when it was signed by President Obama on 
May 11, 2016, there is no significant post-DTSA case law on the 
topic of this article. Nonetheless, this article proposes how these 
provisions should be interpreted when taking into account the 
relevant human rights doctrine and explains how and why such an 
interpretation would differ from the interpretation that the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has favored under the 
E.U.’s copyright regime. The discussion that follows not only 
covers the explicit rules under the trade secret laws, it also 
provides an outline of how these principles have been developed 
under applicable constitutional law doctrine. 
II. THE LIMITATIONS BUILT INTO U.S. AND E.U. TRADE 
SECRET LAW 
While trade secret principles have developed and evolved over 
decades,8 trade secret law in the E.U. and the U.S. is now primarily 
reflected in two sets of largely uniform and harmonized laws. In 
the U.S., this law is set forth in both the UTSA,9 which has now 
 
 8 See Sharon K. Sandeen, The Evolution of Trade Secret Law and Why Courts 
Commit Error When They Do Not Follow the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 33 
HAMLINE L. REV. 493 (2010). 
 9 Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 14 U.L.A. § 539–40 (1980) and 14 U.L.A. § 433 
(1985) [hereinafter the “UTSA”]. 
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been adopted by 48 states, and the DTSA,10 which created a federal 
civil cause of action for trade secret misappropriation that is 
modeled after the UTSA. In the E.U., the governing law is the 
Trade Secret Directive, which has been adopted by and is now 
reflected in the written laws of most E.U.-member states.11 As with 
intellectual property laws, the theory underlying trade secret 
protection is that society gets something that is of greater benefit 
than the advantages that flow from information diffusion and free 
competition. In the case of trade secrets, this includes the 
prevention of unfair competition and additional incentives for 
invention and creation over and above what is provided by patent 
and copyright laws. 
Importantly, for information diffusion, freedom of expression, 
and whistleblowing purposes, none of the cited laws protect all 
business information, or even all confidential information. Rather, 
U.S. and E.U. trade secret law only protect information that meets 
the three requirements of trade secrecy; namely, information that 
(1) is not generally known or readily ascertainable (accessible); (2) 
derives economic (commercial) value from not being known to 
others; and (3) has been the subject of efforts that are reasonable 
under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.12 Thus, no trade 
secret misappropriation claim can prevail for information that is 
already available to the public at the time of the alleged 
misappropriation and few, if any, conflicts with free expression 
should arise. 
For information that does not meet the definition of a trade 
secret, the overarching principle is that the information should be 
free to acquire, disclose, and use by the public, the press, and 
whistleblowers alike, provided that some other law or legal 
 
 10 Pub.L. 114–53, 130 Stat. 376 (enacted May 11, 2016, codified at 18 
U.S.C. § 1836, et seq.) [hereinafter the “DTSA”]. 
 11 Although all E.U.-member states were required to conform their laws to the 
Trade Secret Directive by the transposition date of June, 9, 2018, according to 
Eur-Lex 32016L0943, as of the date of the publication of this article, some E.U.-
member state have yet to fully comply with the Directive. 
 12 See UTSA, supra note 9, at § 1(4); DTSA, supra note 10, at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1839(3); Trade Secret Directive, supra note 1, at Art. 2(1). 
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principle does not constrict such usage.13 Moreover, even where 
some theory of protection for information (including trade secrecy) 
exists, other explicit and ancillary limitations, including those that 
are the focus of the remainder of this article, often apply to require 
that the desire to protect information be balanced against other 
interests. For instance, in both the E.U. and U.S., preliminary and 
permanent injunctive relief ordinarily will not be granted without 
consideration of the public interest14 which is considered in 
conjunction with a request for a protective order. 15 
Although all of the limitations and exceptions to trade secret 
protection are also designed to preserve free competition and 
employee mobility, because we believe the rights of listeners and 
receivers of information are also at stake in many trade secret 
cases, we contend that more consideration should be given to 
whether a third party (including government regulators and the 
public) has an interest in the putative trade secrets. By paying more 
attention to the human right to information, the trade secret 
misappropriation analysis should not assume that the protection of 
information is a positive without: (1) first making certain that the 
information qualifies as trade secrets; and (2) carefully considering 
if the protection of those trade secrets in specific factual contexts 
will unduly interfere with the public’s and the press’ fundamental 
right to information. 
 
 13 In both the E.U. and the U.S., there are laws, in addition to the trade secret 
laws, that may prohibit the use or disclosure of specified information in certain 
settings. For example, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in the 
E.U. and the federal Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905, in the U.S., but often 
a need to balance information protection against the public interest arises in 
those settings as well. 
 14 In the U.S., see Fed. R. Civ. P. 65. In the E.U., see Trade Secret Directive, 
supra note 1, 2. See also, Elizabeth A. Rowe, Trade Secret Litigation and Free 
Speech: Is It Time to Restrain the Plaintiffs, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1425, 1425 (2009) 
(detailing how and when First Amendment issues typically arise in trade secret 
litigation in the U.S. and the standards for the grant of preliminary injunctions). 
 15 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c); Trade Secret Directive, supra note 1, at Art. 9 
(setting rules for Preservation of confidentiality of trade secrets in the course of 
legal proceedings). 
 
MAR. 2020] Trade Secrets and the Right to Information 9 
III. THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF RIGHT TO 
INFORMATION AND ITS OPERATION IN THE U.S. AND E.U. 
An ancillary principle of law that exists and that we contend 
must be considered in trade secret cases is the human right to 
information that is reflected in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and the legal principles of the E.U. and U.S., 
including the values and interests that underlie such right. 
Obviously, this right is strongest when the subject information is 
already available to the public because to restrict access to such 
information risks removing it from the public sphere. But we also 
believe that the human right to information can be implicated in 
cases involving legitimate trade secrets and other confidential 
information. The reason for our concern is simple: humans need 
information to be productive, innovative, and engaged members of 
their communities and the more information that is effectively 
locked-down, the less the public will be informed. 
Humans have a long history of seeking, receiving, and 
imparting information, hampered only by the availability of 
information, the means to record and convey it, and laws and 
norms that restrict its dissemination. While by no means a linear 
progression, the history of humankind includes numerous 
technological advances that have improved its ability to create, 
collect, and share information, thereby increasing the store of 
information and improving and expanding the availability and 
distribution of information. Law and government institutions have 
played central roles in this history, sometimes limiting the creation 
and distribution of information in unfortunate and troubling ways, 
but more often by encouraging and promoting the creation and 
distribution of information. The public’s interest in the 
dissemination of information was particularly acute in the 
aftermath of WWII when “the practices of European fascism 
fueled the reaction against library censorship”16 and a lack of 
government transparency.17 Thus, it is not surprising that when the 
 
 16 United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 238 (2003) (citing M. 
HARRIS, HISTORY OF LIBRARIES IN THE WESTERN WORLD 248 (4th ed. 1995)). 
 17 Infra note 22. 
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delegates gathered after World War II to draft the UDHR, 
provisions were included that addressed the human need for 
information and learning.18 
Unfortunately, while the principles of freedom of speech and 
press (collectively, freedom of expression) are well known, the 
right to information is not;19 but you cannot have freedom of 
expression without some information to impart. As one 
commentator explained: 
[The] relationship [between freedom of expression and information] is 
contiguous and complicated; logical and paradoxical. It is characterized 
by mutual dependencies . . . . [I]nformation can be seen as antecedent 
to expression. However, expression can also produce and disseminate 
information, which suggests a more complex and symbiotic 
relationship.20 
It follows then that the same theoretical justifications for the 
protection of freedom of expression apply to the right to 
information. These rationales include: “self-fulfillment/individual 
autonomy; the advancement of knowledge/discovery of 
truth/avoidance of error; effective participation in democratic 
society; self-government; distrust of government/slippery slope 
arguments.”21 Other justifications, particularly with respect to 
information held by governments, include: the instrumental 
justification noted above (namely, that free expression cannot 
occur without information); a proprietary justification that 
 
 18 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 19; See also Communications 
Concerning Freedom of Information and Freedom of the Press (United States 
Delegation to the General Assembly of the United Nations) (April 23, 1946), 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=E/HR/2 
[https://perma.cc/XAW4-5Y6P]. 
 19 See TARLACH MCGONAGLE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF FREEDOM OF 
EXPRESSION AND INFORMATION WITHIN THE UN: LEAPS AND BOUNDS OR FITS 
AND STARTS?, IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND 
INFORMATION (McGonagle & Donders eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2015) 
(discussing the right to information under international law); Easton, supra note 
2, at 139 (discussing the “right to know” under U.S. law and the applicable 
jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court). 
 20 McGonagle, supra note 19, at 5. 
 21 Id.; see also, Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against 
Compelled Listening, 89 B.U. L. REV. 939, 940 (2009) (setting forth the 
traditional justifications for freedom of expression). 
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government information belongs to the public; and a government 
oversight justification.22 
In the pantheon of human rights, at least as expressed in 
international agreements, the right to information is a relative 
newcomer.23 This is likely because there is often no need to 
affirmatively express and protect a right until it is restricted in 
some manner and because, before the invention of the printing 
press and the wide-spread availability of printed information, the 
quest for information and knowledge was more individualistic. 
However, the right to information has antecedents in the Swedish 
Freedom of Printing Press Act of 1766 (which was written by a 
Finn, Anders Chydenius) and in 18th Century administrative codes 
and government practices.24 More recently, it was the difficulty of 
the press and media to gain access to information about various 
aspects of World War II that led members of the U.S. delegation, 
among others, to advocate for the inclusion of Article 19 in the 
UDHR and for a special United Nations Conference on Freedom of 
Information, which was convened in Geneva, Switzerland in the 
spring of 1948.25 The work at this conference ultimately led to 
Article 19 of the ICCPR.26 
ICCPR, Article 19 has 3 parts, which read: 
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference. 
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right 
shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas 
 
 22 Roy Peled & Yoram Rabin, The Constitutional Right to Information, 42 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 357, 365–68 (2011). 
 23 See United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 238 (2003) (Souter, 
J., dissenting) (providing a history of public libraries in the U.S. and noting that 
the events of World War II prompted greater calls for “freedom of access” to the 
printed word). 
 24 HELEN DARBISHIRE, TEN CHALLENGES FOR THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION IN 
THE AGE OF MEGA-LEAKS, THE UNITED NATIONS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
AND INFORMATION (McGonagle & Donders eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2015) 
(providing an overview of the history of the right to information and noting that 
it was a product of enlightenment thinking). 
 25 G.A. Res. 59 (I), at 95 (Dec. 14, 1946). 
 26 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, at 52 
(Dec. 19, 1966) [hereinafter the ICCPR]. 
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of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, 
in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice. 
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article 
carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be 
subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are 
provided by law and are necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or 
reputations of others; (b) For the protection of national security or of 
public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals. (Emphasis 
added.) 27 
A. The Right to Information in the E.U. 
All E.U. Member States have ratified the ICCPR.28 
Consequently, freedom of expression, including an explicit right to 
information, is a human right that all E.U. Member States are 
bound to recognize, with only the limited exceptions that are 
allowed pursuant to the italicized portions of ICCPR Article 19.3, 
above. Additionally, these same rights are enshrined in the 
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), Article 10,29 
thereby giving the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
jurisdiction to enforce the right to information. 
Significantly, Article 19 of the ICCPR first expresses the rights 
and then sets forth some limitations; rights that we contend should 
serve as a direct counterbalance to the protection of trade secrets 
and other confidential information. While the limitations that are 
contained in Article 19.3 help define when it is appropriate to favor 
 
 27 Id., Art. 19. 
 28 See STATUS OF RATIFICATION INTERACTIVE DASHBOARD, UNITED NATIONS 
HUMAN RIGHTS: OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, 
https://indicators.ohchr.org/. [https://perma.cc/4FYU-G4F9]. 
 29 The ECHR came in force in Finland in 23th of May 1990 through Act 
18.5.1990/439 (SopS 19/1990). The ECHR is not a legislative instrument of the 
E.U. and it has as its Members also non-E.U. Member States. However, all E.U. 
Member States are also Members to the ECHR and Article 52(3) of the Charter 
links the interpretation of the Charter provisions to the ECHR. Article 52(3) of 
the Charter provides: “In so far as this Convention contains rights which 
correspond to the rights guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and the scope of those 
rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This 
provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection.” In 
this article, the application area for the ECHR will be referred to as Europe and 
the application area for the Charter will be referred to as the E.U. 
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trade secret protection over the right to information, they do not 
suggest that the right to information should be ignored if the listed 
circumstances appear to be applicable. Rather, Article 19.3 directs 
that the necessity for any limitations on the right to information 
must be fully considered. 
The ECHR is very similarly worded with the ICCPR. Article 
10 of the ECHR provides: “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of 
expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and 
to receive and impart information and ideas without interference 
by public authority and regardless of frontiers.”30 Gathering 
information and access to information has been highlighted by the 
ECtHR as an important preliminary part of the protection of press 
freedoms. Therefore, in Europe, there has to be effective 
enforcement mechanisms available to ensure press access to public 
documents. If a journalist’s intention is to impart relevant 
information of public concern to the public and contribute to the 
public debate, but access to information is denied, the right to 
impart information is violated.31 
Even though earlier interpretation of the ECHR did not 
recognize a separate right to access information, the ECtHR has 
broadened its interpretation so that the right to receive information 
now also includes the right to access information and government 
documents in some situations. This expanded right is given not 
only to journalists, but also to non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), which likewise serve a watchdog role in society.32 
Similarly, the ECtHR extended the right of access to researchers in 
a case where access to original documents concerning the 
 
 30 Article 10 will be discussed in a more detailed manner, including the 
justified limitations to freedom of expression, in Part III. 
 31 Roşiianu v. Romania, 2014 Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 27329/06. 
 32 Youth Initiative for Human Rights v. Serbia, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 
48135/06; Erhaltung v. Austria, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 39534/07. The 
approach where the access right is only given to a specific type of groups, 
having watchdog role, has been criticized from the perspective that at present 
also others than press and similar type of groups can initiate public discourse on 
matters of general interest through use of social media. See LORNA WOODS, 
DIGITAL FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN THE EU, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON EU 
LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 397 (Sionaidh Douglas-Scott & Nicolas Hatzis eds., 
2017). 
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Hungarian secret service was sought for legitimate historical 
research, finding that such access was part of the historian’s 
freedom of expression.33 It is also noteworthy that the Charter 
provides in Article 42 for a right of access to E.U. Parliament, 
Council, and Commission documents. This right belongs to E.U. 
citizens and residents, including also legal entities having a 
registered office in any E.U. Member State.34 Yet, the access right 
is not an absolute one, as occasionally there might be legitimate 
reasons to limit the right to information.35 
B. The Right to Information in the U.S. 
In the U.S., the source of the right to information is more 
difficult to see and understand, in part, because it is an ancillary (or 
penumbral) aspect of the First Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution’s prohibition on government restrictions on free 
speech and freedom of the press,36 but also because state 
constitutions, the common law, and both federal and state laws 
must be considered. The source and scope of the right to 
information in the U.S. is also obscured by the fact that neither the 
UDHR or the ICCPR37 are self-executing in the U.S., meaning that 
they are not themselves binding law in the U.S. but only a 
“statement of principles” with “moral authority.”38 As the U.S. 
Supreme Court explained in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: 
But the [UDHR] does not of its own force impose obligations as a 
matter of international law . . . . And, although the [ICCPR] does bind 
 
 33 Kenedi v. Hungary, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. App. no. 31475/05. 
 34 This right is also recognized under Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access 
to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, 2001 O.J. (L145) 
43; and Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Art. 15.3., 2003 O.J. 
(C 115) 54, 55. 
 35 DOMINIKA BYCHAWSKA-SINIARSKA, PROTECTING THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM 
OF EXPRESSION UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS – A 
HANDBOOK FOR LEGAL PRACTITIONERS 17 (2017) (explaining Matky v. Czech 
Republic, 2006 Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 19101/03). 
 36 See Easton, supra note 2. 
 37 Although the ICCPR was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly 
on 19 December 1966 and entered into force 23 March 1976, the United States 
did not ratify the ICCPR (with reservations) until September 8, 1992. 
 38 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 735 (2004). 
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the United States as a matter of international law, the United States 
ratified the Covenant on the express understanding that it was not self-
executing and so did not itself create obligations enforceable in the 
[US] federal courts.39 
Further complicating an understanding of the right to 
information in the U.S. is the confusing, multi-layered, and highly 
contextual jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court concerning 
such right.40 Moreover, the U.S. and each of the fifty individual 
states have adopted freedom of information laws which are 
generally designed to assure that both the public and the press have 
access to government-held information, but with variations and 
exceptions, including the so-called “trade secret exception.”41 
The seeds of a U.S. constitutional right to information first 
began to be recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1923 in 
Meyer v. Nebraska42 and was reaffirmed in 1943 in Martin v. City 
of Struthers when the Court explained the instrumental nature of 
the right: 
The right of freedom of speech and press has broad scope. The authors 
of the First Amendment knew that novel and unconventional ideas 
might disturb the complacent, but they chose to encourage a freedom 
which they believed essential if vigorous enlightenment was ever to 
triumph over slothful ignorance. This freedom embraces the right to 
distribute literature, . . . and necessarily protects the right to receive it.43 
 
 39 Id. at 734–35. 
 40 See, David L. Hudson, Jr., Right to Receive Information, 10 U. ST. THOMAS 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 89 (2010); 74 UMKC L. REV. 799 (2006); Jamie Kennedy, 
The Right to Receive Information: The Current State of the Doctrine and The 
Best Application for the Future, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 789 (2005); Barry P. 
McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of Information: Towards A 
Realistic Right to Gather Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 
249 (2004); Easton, supra note 2. 
 41 Under the federal Freedom of Information Act, see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) 
(2018). 
 42 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923) (finding a state statute which 
forbade any teaching except in English unconstitutional). 
 43 Martin v. City of Struthers, Ohio, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943); see also 
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. 
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (“It is the purpose of the First Amendment to 
preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately 
prevail . . . . It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, 
political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here. 
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From this, it has long been recognized that the First 
Amendment protects both the speaker and the listener from 
inappropriate government restrictions on speech and the press, 
which in trade secret cases can come in the form of injunctive 
relief.44 This includes the “important corollary right” to receive 
information and ideas.45 What is less clear, and more limited under 
U.S. jurisprudence, is another arguably corollary right: the right to 
collect and access information.46 The U.S. Supreme Court has 
noted the special role of information gathering, particularly by the 
press, in ensuring the benefits of the First Amendment.47 Thus, 
given a specific restriction and a particular context, a right of 
access to information has been recognized in some cases.48 For 
 
That right may not constitutionally be abridged either by Congress or by the 
FCC.”); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); Lamont v. Postmaster 
Gen. of U. S., 381 U.S. 301, 307–08 (1965) (concurrence of Brennan and 
Goldberg) (“It is true that the First Amendment contains no specific guarantee of 
access to publications. However, the protection of the Bill of Rights goes 
beyond the specific guarantees to protect from congressional abridgment those 
equally fundamental personal rights necessary to make the express guarantees 
fully meaningful.”); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945). 
 44 See Sandvig v. Sessions, 315 F. Supp. 3d 1, 17 (D.D.C. 2018), citing e.g., 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964) (noting that “private 
speech prohibitions can still implicate the First Amendment when given the 
imprimatur of state protection through civil or criminal law”). 
 45 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 
U.S. 753, 762-763 (1972) (citing cases); Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 
(1982). 
 46 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 726–28 (1972) (Stewart, J., 
dissenting) (“A corollary of the right to publish must be the right to gather news. 
The full flow of information to the public protected by the free-press guarantee 
would be severely curtailed if no protection whatever were afforded to the 
process by which news is assembled and disseminated.”). 
 47 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972) (“[W]ithout some protection 
for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated.”); First 
National Bank of Boston v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978) (“The First 
Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and self-expression of 
individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of information from 
which members of the public may draw.”). 
 48 See, e.g., Fusaro v. Logan, 930 F. 3d 241, 253 (4th Cir. 2019) (noting that 
“the Supreme Court has strongly signaled that certain types of conditions on 
access to government information may be subject to First Amendment 
scrutiny”). 
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instance, there is rich jurisprudence that recognizes the right of 
individuals and the press to access information concerning criminal 
proceedings.49 This right has been extended by various courts to 
civil trials and various administrative proceedings.50 Additionally, 
in cases that have challenged restrictions placed on libraries, the 
courts have noted the need of library patrons to have access to a 
diversity of information.51 
Despite the obvious and practical connection between the 
ability to gather and access information and free expression, the 
constitutional right to gather and access information in the U.S. is 
limited. However, a statutory right to access information may exist 
at both the state and federal levels, particularly pursuant to so-
called “freedom of information acts” and “sunshine laws.” In this 
regard, while the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that there is, at 
best, a limited constitutional or common law right to access certain 
government information (the right of access principally being a 
matter of policy to be determined by the legislative branch through 
the adoption of freedom of information and similar laws),52 the 
 
 49 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) and its 
progeny; see also, Raleigh Hannah Levine, Toward a New Public Access 
Doctrine, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1739 (2006) (describing the confused state of 
this jurisprudence, particularly at the trial court level). 
 50 See, e.g., Phillips v. DeWine, 841 F.3d 405, 418 (6th Cir. 2016) 
(citing Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C., 710 F.2d 1165, 1178 (6th 
Cir. 1983)); United States v. DeJournett, 817 F.3d 479, 484–85 (6th Cir. 2016); 
In re Search of Fair Fin., 692 F.3d 424 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Miami 
Univ., 294 F.3d 797 (6th Cir. 2002); Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 
681 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 51 See, e.g., Kreimer v. Bureau of Police for Town of Morristown, 958 F.2d 
1242, 1255 (3d Cir. 1992) (“Our review of the Supreme Court’s decisions 
confirms that the First Amendment does not merely prohibit the government 
from enacting laws that censor information, but additionally encompasses the 
positive right of public access to information and ideas.”); see also, Anne 
Klinefelter, First Amendment Limits on Library Collection Management, 102 
LAW LIBRARY J. 343, 344 (2010). 
 52 See, e.g., McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221, 222 (2013) (holding that there 
is no fundamental right to access public information); Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 
438 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1978) (“The Constitution itself is neither a Freedom of 
Information Act nor an Official Secrets Act,” and “[n]either the First 
Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment mandates a right of access to 
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Court has also stated that the federal Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) was “designed to create a broad right of access to official 
information.”53 
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has been slow to define the 
sources and scope of the right to information, particularly with 
respect to government held information and the right to gather or 
access information as opposed to receive it,54 it has developed an 
important corollary principle of law; namely, the strong public 
policy of the U.S. that favors the unfettered collection, use, and 
distribution of publicly disclosed information.55 As was famously 
expressed by Justice Brandeis in his dissent in International News 
Serv. v. Associated Press: “[t]he general rule of law is, that the 
noblest of human productions—knowledge, truths ascertained, 
conceptions, and ideas—become, after voluntary communication 
to others, free as the air to common use.”56 This principle has 
found expression in numerous information law cases decided by 
the U.S. Supreme Court since INS. In Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron 
Corp., for instance, the Court explained: “that which is in the 
public domain cannot be removed therefrom by action of the 
States” and that “all ideas in general circulation [are] dedicated to 
the common good unless they are protected by a valid patent.”57 It 
 
government information or sources of information within the government’s 
control.”). 
 53 EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973). 
 54 See, e.g., McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221, 222 (2013) (holding that there 
is no fundamental right to access government information). 
 55 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (“the State may not, 
consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment, contract the spectrum of 
available knowledge”). Note: The word “public” is used here to refer to publicly 
available information, not as a synonym for government information. A variety 
of U.S. laws and case decisions define publicly available information, including 
U.S. patent law and its definition of “prior art” and U.S. copyright law and its 
definition of the “public domain.” 
 56 Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting). 
 57 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974) (quoting Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 668 
(1969) and citing Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 570–571 (1973)); Sears, 
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-
Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237–238 (1964); Int’l News Serv. v. 
Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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is also reflected in cases that involved tort claims related to 
published information.58 Most recently, in a case centered on the 
meaning of Exemption 4 of FOIA, the U.S. Supreme Court 
reiterated this core principle when it stated that, at a minimum, the 
definition of “confidential” under FOIA does not include 
information that was freely shared.59 
C. The Need to Balance Fundamental Rights Against Trade Secret 
Protection 
Although the source and the scope of the right to information 
may be inconsistent between the E.U. and U.S., the foregoing 
establishes that the right to information (particularly with respect 
to government information and information that has been made 
public) is an important value both in the U.S. and E.U. This is 
buttressed by the fact that while limitations on the right to 
information are allowed pursuant to Article 19.3 of the ICCPR, 
they must be limited in scope and “necessary” to further specified 
purposes. Thus, while the “rights of others” language of Article 
19.3 of the ICCPR, and similar U.S. jurisprudence will 
undoubtedly be cited by trade secret owners as the reason why 
trade secret protection can co-exist with the right to information, a 
critical question is how the right to information and the rights of 
trade secret owners can be properly balanced, particularly when the 
subject trade secrets are of great public interest. In this context, it is 
noteworthy that in some instances trade secrets may be in the 
possession of governmental agencies, leading to a situation where 
freedom of information laws would be applicable to such 
information. Accordingly, the Trade Secret Directive in its 
preamble explicitly mentions some of the E.U.’s freedom of 
 
 58 See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) (intentional infliction of 
emotional distress); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (libel, 
invasion of privacy); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) 
(public disclosure of private facts); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (false 
light privacy); and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) 
(defamation). 
 59 Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356, 2363 (2019). 
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information laws, which remain applicable notwithstanding 
introduction of the Trade Secret Directive.60 
We think that acknowledging and understanding the human 
right to information means that the starting point for the analysis 
should place the burden on the trade secret owner to establish why 
an exception to the right to information applies, not the other way 
around as is often the case. 
We further submit that a primary purpose behind the 
limitations and exceptions of trade secret law are to protect and 
preserve the right to information (sometimes referred to as the 
“right to know”) and, accordingly, that the interpretation and 
application of trade secret law should always balance the value and 
benefits of information diffusion, including the right of free 
expression in all its forms, against the asserted rights of the trade 
secret owner. This approach is consistent with most freedom of 
information laws that state a default rule of public access with 
respect to information held by governments61 and with many case 
 
 60 Trade Secret Directive, supra note 1, at preamble 11 (“This Directive 
should not affect the application of Union or national rules that require the 
disclosure of information, including trade secrets, to the public or to public 
authorities. Nor should it affect the application of rules that allow public 
authorities to collect information for the performance of their duties, or rules 
that allow or require any subsequent disclosure by those public authorities of 
relevant information to the public. Such rules include, in particular, rules on the 
disclosure by the Union’s institutions and bodies or national public authorities of 
business- related information they hold pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 
1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council (4), Regulation (EC) 
No 1367/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council (5) and Directive 
2003/4/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (6), or pursuant to 
other rules on public access to documents or on the transparency obligations of 
national public authorities.”). 
 61 See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2018); E.U. Charter 
of Fundamental Rights art. 42; Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001, of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to 
European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, 2001 O.J. (L 145) 
31; Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 1 
(“Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its 
registered office in a Member State, shall have a right of access to documents of 
the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, whatever their medium, 
subject to the principles and the conditions to be defined in accordance with this 
paragraph.”). 
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decisions in the E.U. and U.S. that balance principles of free 
expression against demands that certain information be kept 
confidential. Often, the starting point of the analysis in these cases 
is not the protection of information but the default rule of public 
accessibility.62 
IV. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND WHISTLEBLOWING 
PRINCIPLES IN THE E.U. AND US 
In the following parts of this article, we address two specific 
public (or third-party) interests—freedom of expression and 
whistleblowing—and discuss how the change in focus we advocate 
should be implemented in those contexts. Although often framed 
as defenses to information misappropriation claims, including in 
cases where trade secret misappropriation is alleged, we believe 
that the status of the right to information as a human right requires 
that it receive greater and earlier attention.63 The same approach 
can be undertaken in other contexts as well, for instance with 
respect to trade secret information that is held by governments, is 
needed by government regulators, or is needed as a matter of 
public safety. 
A. Freedom of Expression and Media Under the ECHR and the 
E.U. Charter 
Under Article 10 of ECHR: “[e]veryone has the right to 
freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold 
 
 62 The public access to information under these rules is the default, but the 
interpretation and application of these rules is occasionally controversial. Even 
though protection of commercial interests, including intellectual property, is an 
exception to the default of public access, it sometimes seems that companies 
have been given too much power to prevent access to the commercial 
information they have submitted to the public authorities in the process of 
receiving, for example, marketing authorization to their products. See Emilia 
Korkea-aho & Päivi Leino, Who Owns the Information Held by EU Agencies? 
Weed Killers, Commercially Sensitive Information and Transparent and 
Participatory Governance, 54 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 1059, 1092 (2017). 
 63 See Lydia Loren, Fair Use: An Affirmative Defense?, 90 WASH. L. REV. 
685, 685 (2015) (arguing with respect to fair use in copyright that: “Fair use 
should not be seen as an affirmative defense, but should instead be treated as a 
defense that shapes the scope of a copyright owner’s rights.”). 
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opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without 
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.”64 As 
has often been stated, freedom of expression forms a cornerstone 
of democratic society and enables self-fulfillment of each 
individual.65 Thus, in the E.U., the starting point is that the scope of 
this right is broad, as the freedom of expression extends to all 
expressions, groups, or individuals and to all media.66 However, 
this right is not without exception in either the E.U. or the U.S. In 
fact, the ECtHR has utilized Article 17 of the ECHR, which 
prevents abuse of rights, to hold that freedom of expression may 
not be used to lead to the destruction of the rights and freedoms of 
others as granted by the ECHR. Thus, based on Article 17 some 
content has not been protectable through freedom of expression in 
the E.U. For example, the ECtHR has made such exclusions in 
respect to the content that has promoted racism and Nazi ideology 
and incitement to hatred and racial discrimination. This type of 
content would violate other fundamental values protectable under 
the Convention, namely non-discrimination and social peace, and 
therefore this type of expression cannot receive protection in 
Europe. 67 
The ECHR conception of freedom of expression has three 
components: 1) freedom to hold opinions; 2) freedom to receive 
information and ideas; and 3) freedom to impart information and 
ideas. These components are very much intertwined with each 
other. For example, freedom to impart information contains a 
possibility to criticize government.68 Here, one can see the link 
between freedom to impart information and hold opinions. Under 
the ECHR, freedom of the media is considered to form part of the 
 
 64 This is in accordance with Article 19 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR). Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 
(III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 65 See, e.g., Dichand et al. v. Austria, App. No. 29271/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(2002). 
 66 BYCHAWSKA-SINIARSKA, supra note 36, at 12. 
 67 See generally COUNCIL OF EUR., Guide on Article 17 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, Prohibition of Abuse of Rights (Aug. 31, 2019), 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_17_ENG.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N4X5-B8DT] [hereinafter “Guide on Article 17”]. 
 68 BYCHAWSKA-SINIARSKA, supra note 35, at 13. 
MAR. 2020] Trade Secrets and the Right to Information 23 
freedom of expression, as one can derive from the three 
components of freedom of expression together the freedom of the 
press and the freedom of the media.69 In the case law of the ECtHR 
the freedom of the media is considered often as a part of the 
public’s right to receive information, which further is considered to 
form a foundation for any democratic society. There is a vast 
amount of case law from the ECtHR considering the freedom of 
the media. 70 For instance, it has been highlighted that “the press 
plays a pre-eminent role in a State governed by the rule of law.”71 
The freedom of the media in the E.U. is further guaranteed 
through protection of journalistic activities. The press is entitled to 
serve a function as social watchdogs and may reveal confidential 
information even if it has been illegally received.72 In the case of 
Dupuis and Others v. France it was held that even though 
journalists had received information due to breach of secrecy, they 
were contributing to the important public debate and the press was 
serving the watchdog role in a democratic society.73 However, 
when journalists enjoy the protection under Article 10 of the 
ECHR they are obliged to follow the ethics of journalism.74 The 
professional press is vital for the quality of public debate due to 
these journalistic ethics that generally demand that the press verify 
the information it reports and put the discussion in context so that 
all relevant perspectives are objectively reflected.75 Consequently, 
 
 69 WOLFGANG BENEDEK & MATTHIAS C. KETTEMANN, FREEDOM OF 
EXPRESSION AND THE INTERNET 23 (Council of Europe 2013). 
 70 Id. at 30–32. 
 71 Castells v. Spain, App. No. 11798/85, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1992); Prager & 
Oberschlick v. Austria, App. No. 15974/90, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1995). 
 72 Trine Baumbach, Chilling Effect as a European Court of Human Rights’ 
Concept in Media Law Cases, 6 BERGEN J. CRIM. L. & CRIM. JUST. 92, 93–94 
(2018). For instance, in the case of Haldimann v. Switzerland, journalists used 
hidden cameras in collecting information. Later the material was broadcasted, 
but in a manner that the recorded person’s identity was disguised. The Court 
found that the method used in collecting and imparting information was 
acceptable. 
 73 Dupuis et al. v. France, App. No. 1914/02, Eur. Ct. H.R., 46–47 (2007). 
 74 BENEDEK & KETTEMANN, supra note 69, at 30–32. 
 75 Baumbach, supra note 72, at 93. 
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information often cannot be published without further investigation 
and vetting.76 
The protection of journalistic sources is also an important part 
of media freedom in Europe. A fear of a disclosure of an 
information source has the potential of creating a chilling effect to 
journalistic activities, as media would in the end be deprived from 
receiving information on issues of public concern.77 Relatedly, 
whistleblowers are likewise protected under freedom of speech. 
The Council of Europe Recommendation on protection of 
whistleblowers defines whistleblowers to “mean any person who 
reports or discloses information on a threat or harm to the public 
interest in the context of their work-based relationship, whether it 
be in the public or private sector.”78 The recommendation further 
suggests that members establish a framework to protect 
whistleblowers against retaliation among others.79 
Despite the foregoing, but similar to the ICCPR provision 
quoted above, there are some legitimate reasons to restrict freedom 
of expression, and Article 10(2) of the ECHR describes 
possibilities for taking legislative measures for such purposes.80 
But in the framework of ICCPR, the freedom to hold opinions is an 
absolute right and cannot be limited.81 However, the ECHR seems 
to be different from the ICCPR as the structure of Article 10 
 
 76 A discussion of adherence to journalistic ethics, particularly in First 
Amendment cases, is not prevalent in the United States. However, the need to 
understand and follow principles of journalistic ethics has long been taught in 
journalism schools throughout the U.S. and is a stated policy of many media 
outlets in the U.S. See, e.g., N.Y. TIMES, Ethical Journalism: A Handbook of 
Values and Practices for the News and Editorial Departments, 
https://www.nytimes.com/editorial-standards/ethical-journalism.html (last 
visited Mar. 18, 2020) [https://perma.cc/8ND8-E7KM]. 
 77 Id. 
 78 COUNCIL OF EUR., Protection of Whistleblowers, Recommendation 
CM/Rec(2014)(7), 1, 6 (Oct. 2014) http://assembly.coe.int 
[https://perma.cc/5RXF-CWCR]. 
 79 Id. 
 80 EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1, 12 (Oct. 2013) 
http://assembly.coe.int [https://perma.cc/5RXF-CWCR]. 
 81 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 at 52 
(Dec. 19, 1966) (Article 19). 
MAR. 2020] Trade Secrets and the Right to Information 25 
indicates that all aspects of freedom of expression could be subject 
to limitations.82 Article 10 of ECHR provides, in relevant part: 
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and 
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, 
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a 
democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial 
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for 
the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or 
rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in 
confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the 
judiciary.83 
Thus, freedom of expression may only be limited if the 
restriction is one of the legitimate reasons described in the Article 
and other requirements are also met. 
Related to the focus of this article on trade secrets, one 
recognized legitimate purpose is to protect “confidentiality.”84 
However, even though protection of confidentiality is a justified 
reason to restrict freedom of expression, if freedom of expression 
is limited, the limitation must be “necessary” in a democratic 
society.85 The ECtHR has interpreted this to mean a “pressing 
social need.”86 Therefore, not all confidential information can be 
regarded as a justified exception to the freedom of expression. The 
objective of the expression has an impact on the analysis as well. 
Commercial speech is not given the same value and therefore 
European countries generally have more latitude to limit such 
speech.87 For example, it was justified to limit publication of firm-
related confidential information in a trade magazine.88 
Yet, even though the nature of the speech has an impact on the 
margin of appreciation of the member states, the ECtHR has 
emphasized that work-related speech without a link to the public 
 
 82 See BENEDEK & KETTEMANN, supra note 69, at 27. 
 83 EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 80. 
 84 Article 10(2) ECHR. 
 85 Yildirim v. Turkey, App. No. 3111/10, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 66–68 (2012). 
 86 Observer & Guardian v. the United Kingdom, 1991 Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 
13585/88, ¶ 59. 
 87 Markt intern Verlag GmbH & Klaus Beermann v. Germany, 1989 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. App. No. 10572/83, ¶¶ 33, 36. 
 88 Id. at ¶ 35. 
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interest is protectable by freedom of expression.89 In these 
situations, authorities need to conduct an appropriate balancing 
between employees’ right to freedom of expression against 
employer’s business interest, including the potential damage 
caused by the speech.90 And this assessment cannot be based 
purely on contractual analysis.91 This proportionality analysis 
requirement on freedom of expression limitations is important 
when it comes to employees’ contract-based confidentiality 
obligations. 
Additionally, under Article 10, the limitations must be 
prescribed by law, although in specific cases common law 
principles have been accepted as sufficiently clear and precise to 
fulfill this requirement.92 Also, when analyzing the legitimacy of 
the restriction, the ECtHR considers whether the restriction is 
proportionate to the aim pursued.93 If it is disproportionate it will 
violate freedom of expression under Article 10, but it is 
noteworthy, that the allowed limitations are interpreted in a narrow 
manner.94 Thus, under Article 10 of the ECHR, freedom of 
expression is the default rule and the derogations are only allowed 
when all the criteria are met. No other criteria can qualify for 
derogation and the interpretation of a limitation cannot go beyond 
the normal language utilized in Article 10(2).95 
Three cases from the ECtHR help to illustrate European law 
concerning whistleblowing activity and how freedom of expression 
is evaluated and balanced within this context. Even though these 
cases do not directly relate to trade secrets, they illustrate the 
ECtHR’s balancing between various interests at stake, particularly 
the importance of the freedom of speech in a democratic society. 
Thus, these cases provide some guidance on how the E.U.’s new 
 
 89 Id. at ¶¶ 26, 33; Herbai v. Hungary, 2019 Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 11608/15, 
¶¶ 41–43. 
 90 Herbai v. Hungary at ¶¶ 45–48, 50. 
 91 Id. at ¶50. 
 92 See, e.g., The Sunday Times v. The United Kingdom, 1979 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
App. No. 6538/74, ¶¶ 46–53. 
 93 Id. at ¶ 62. 
 94 Id. at ¶ 65. 
 95 BYCHAWSKA-SINIARSKA, supra note 36, at 35. 
MAR. 2020] Trade Secrets and the Right to Information 27 
whistleblowing provisions (discussed in more detail in Part V. B. 
below) are to be interpreted under the Trade Secret Directive. 
In Guja v. Moldova, a civil servant was allowed to reveal 
information concerning wrongdoings in the Public Prosecutor’s 
Office because it was more important in a democratic society to 
receive the information on wrongdoings and have open discussion 
on that than to maintain the public’s confidence in the Office.96 
The dismissal of the civil servant was considered to violate 
freedom of speech.97 By way of contrast, in Bathellier v. France, a 
head of the human resources department of a state electric 
company reported about issues in the company, which he deemed 
to be a danger for public security.98 As a result, he was forced to 
retire from the company.99 The ECtHR considered that the person 
who reported the facts was not sufficiently capable of evaluating 
the matter, even though he had a high position in the company and 
that he exaggerated the situation.100 The ECtHR also emphasized 
that the public disclosure is the last resort after reporting the issues 
internally in the company and informing the superiors. In this case, 
the person had not even sent a copy of the letter to his company but 
only to a representative of public authorities.101 Thus, the ECtHR 
dismissed the application because the applicant had gone beyond 
the limit of protected freedom of expression.102 
Similarly, in Heinisch v. Germany, a geriatric nurse reported 
poor quality of care in a private nursing home.103 The 
proportionality test was used to weigh the employee’s right to 
signal illegal conduct or wrongdoing on the part of his or her 
employer against the employer’s right to protection of its 
reputation and commercial interests.104 The ECtHR concluded that 
there was a public interest in knowing the information when taking 
 
 96 Guja v. Moldova, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 14277/04 ¶ 91. 
 97 Id. at ¶ 97. 
 98 Bathellier v. France, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 49001/07. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Heinisch v. Germany, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 28274/08 ¶ 3. 
 104 Id. at ¶ 66. 
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into account the vulnerable situation of elderly people and the need 
to prevent abuse.105 However, each employee has a duty of loyalty 
and discretion. Therefore, the disclosure should be first made to 
their superior or to other competent authorities.106 Only in cases 
when these alternative means are “clearly impracticable” should 
the information “as a last resort, be disclosed to the public.”107 
Because the ECtHR found that the nurse had used alternative ways 
of disclosing the information to her superiors, the employee was 
found to have acted in good faith.108 The public interest outweighed 
the employer’s right to protect its business reputation and the 
employee’s dismissal was too severe a sanction, resulting in a 
violation of the employee’s freedom of expression.109 
The case law of the ECtHR is also important when interpreting 
the relevant Charter provisions, which include Articles 11(1) and 
11(2).110 Article 11 of the Charter is understood to follow the 
Article 10 of the ECHR and pursuant to Article 52(3) of the 
Charter, the meaning and scope of this right are the same as those 
guaranteed by the ECHR.111 
There is some IP-related case law from the CJEU where the 
Charter Article on freedom of expression has been applied and 
which illuminates the importance of freedom of expression in the 
context of IP protection. But these cases also show the requirement 
of balancing between different fundamental rights and different 
interests. These cases support our assertion that trade secret rights 
should be balanced against other rights, most notably the right to 
information, freedom of expression, and the related interest to 
protect whistleblowing. More particularly, the following copyright 
 
 105 Id. at ¶ 71. 
 106 Id. at ¶ 65. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. at ¶ 72. 
 109 Id. at ¶ 73. 
 110 EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 80. Article 11(1) 
(“Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include 
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas 
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.”); and 
Article 11(2) (“The freedom and pluralism of the media shall be respected.”). 
 111 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 2007 O.J. (C 
303), 17–35. 
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cases show the margin of appreciation left for the Member States’ 
courts in the balancing exercise. 
The Deckmyn case is one important demonstration of these 
aspects.112 The case was about interpretation of the parody-
exception provided by Article 5(3)(k) of the Information Society 
Directive 2001/29.113 The CJEU understood parody as a way to 
express one’s opinion and therefore it was connected to freedom of 
expression.114 Moreover, the CJEU noted that the parody-exception 
must be interpreted in a manner which efficiently serves the 
purpose of the exception.115 This meant, among other things, that 
the parody-exception must not comply with specific requirements 
listed by the national court.116 The CJEU’s approach in this case 
has been understood in a manner that the parody-exception was 
interpreted more broadly than the traditional approach to copyright 
exceptions that the E.U. would have allowed.117 Significantly, this 
was done in order to ensure compatibility with the requirements on 
freedom of expression under Article 11(1) of the Charter.118 Thus, 
in the Deckmyn case the CJEU guided courts to strike a fair 
balance between the interests and rights of authors and the freedom 
of expression of the user of a protected work who is relying on the 
exception for parody.119 Consequently, there has to be balancing 
between protection of intellectual property and freedom of 
expression. 
 
 112 Case C‑201/13, Deckmyn v. Vandersteen & Others, EUR-Lex CELEX 
62013CJ0201 (Sept. 3, 2014). 
 113 Id. at ¶ 13. 
 114 Id. at ¶ 25. 
 115 Id. at ¶ 27. 
 116 Id. at ¶¶ 20–25. The CJEU held that, among others, the parody does not 
need to display an original character of its own, nor mention the source of a 
parodied work. Id. at ¶ 33. 
 117 Id. at ¶ 24. 
 118 Christophe Geiger et. al, Limitations and Exceptions as Key Elements of 
the Legal Framework for Copyright in the European Union – Opinion of the 
European Copyright Society on the Judgment of the CJEU in Case C-201/13 
Deckmyn, 46 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 93, 97–99 (2015). 
 119 Case C‑201/13, Deckmyn v. Vandersteen & Others, EUR-Lex CELEX 
62013CJ0201 (Sept. 3, 2014).at ¶ 26. 
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However, in the Deckmyn case the issue was also whether an 
author can prevent a user who is relying on the parody-exception 
to use the original work in a context where the message conveyed 
is discriminatory.120 From the perspective of fundamental rights 
discourse, it is noteworthy that some content is not protectable 
under freedom of expression in Europe.121 As explained earlier, 
racial discrimination belongs to non-protectable content.122 
Consequently, in some instances, discriminatory messages could 
go beyond what is acceptable in a democratic society and this type 
of message cannot benefit from freedom of expression, leading to a 
potential situation that it cannot be protected through the parody-
exception either. In fact, the CJEU also referred in the case to the 
non-discrimination principle under Article 21(1) of the Charter.123 
In the GS Media case, which relates to hyperlinks to 
copyrighted material, the CJEU highlighted that the Internet is 
important to freedom of expression and information.124 Hyperlinks 
are necessary to internet’s operation and to the exchange of 
information and opinions. The CJEU also referred to the balancing 
between various fundamental rights under the Information Society 
Directive.125 It was especially stressed by reference to recitals 3 and 
31 of the Directive 2001/29 that the fair balance between the 
protection of intellectual property rights (authors’ rights) and 
freedom of expression (users’ rights) must be maintained in the 
electronic environment.126 What is interesting in this case, is that 
freedom of expression was taken into account even without the 
 
 120 Id. at ¶ 12. 
 121 See generally Guide on Article 17, supra note 67. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Deckmyn v. Vandersteen at ¶¶ 29–30. The CJEU’s approach in the case 
has been criticized on the basis that the E.U. has not harmonized moral rights as 
part of the copyright regime. Giving power to an author to prevent the use of 
his/her work in a parody context that is discriminatory has been understood as a 
step towards harmonizing moral rights in the European Union. Geiger et. al, 
supra note 73, at 99. 
 124 Case C-160/15, GS Media BV v Sanoma Media Netherlands BV, Playboy 
Enterprises International Inc., Britt Geertruida Dekker, EUR-Lex CELEX 
62015CA0160 (2016), ¶ 45. 
 125 Id. at ¶ 31. 
 126 Id. at ¶ 31. 
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support of an explicit exception linked to this freedom. Rather, it 
was considered applicable due to its relevance to the internet 
context more generally. It was linked to the users’ right to access 
information, more particularly, to the exchange of information and 
opinions. This part of the decision seems to be in line with the 
understanding of how the internet can be regulated in a manner 
that serves as an infrastructure for freedom of speech.127 However, 
the end result of the GS Media case can be criticized as it created 
different kinds of duties for different types of users in the internet 
environment, which complicated the evaluation whether 
hyperlinking is allowed or not.128 In fact, in this case the CJEU 
modified its approach to hyperlinks and started to apply a more 
restrictive approach when compared to its previous case law on 
hyperlinks.129 However, the valuable part of the CJEU’s reasoning 
on the importance of the internet to freedom of expression has 
been referred to in the CJEU’s subsequent case law.130 
The CJEU has just recently given three decisions on the 
balancing between copyright protection and freedom of 
expression.131 In two of these cases, the question was about 
interpretation of explicit exceptions under the Information Society 
Directive.132 More particularly, it was asked if national courts could 
 
 127 See discussion about Internet as a freedom of speech architecture, Jack M. 
Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 427 
(2008–2009). 
 128 See, e.g., Eleanora Rosati, GS Media and its implications for the 
construction of the right of communication to the public within EU copyright 
architecture, COMMON MARKET L. REV. 1221 (2017). 
 129 Tuomas Mylly, Proportionality in the CJEU’s Internet Copyright Case 
Law: Invasive or Resilient?, 279–82, in GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU LAW AND 
THE EU DIGITAL ORDER, Kluwer Law International (Ulf Bernitz, Xavier 
Groussot, Jaan Paju & Sube de Vries eds., 2020). 
 130 Case C‑516/17, Spiegel Online GmbH v. Volker Beck, EUR-Lex CELEX 
62017CC0516, ¶ 81 (Jan. 10, 2019). 
 131 Id.; Case C-476/17 Pelham & Others v. Hütter, EUR-Lex CELEX 
62017CC0476 (Dec. 12, 2018); Case C-469/17 Funke Medien NRW GmbH v. 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, EUR-Lex CELEX 62017CC0469 (Oct. 25, 2018). 
 132 Council Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright 
and related rights in the information society [hereinafter “the Information 
Society Directive”]. 
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depart from the restrictive interpretation of the exceptions in order 
to give full respect to freedom of expression.133 First, the CJEU 
held in all three cases that Member States are not allowed to 
implement exceptions beyond those listed in the Information 
Society Directive.134 Second, in two of these cases, the CJEU held 
that as a general rule, derogations from the main rule are to be 
interpreted narrowly, the main rule being the exclusive rights given 
to the rightsholders. The national courts must apply an 
interpretation which is consistent with the wording used in the 
specific exception and in addition adhere to the strict requirements 
of the three-step test under Article 5(5) of the Information Society 
Directive which requires: (1) a special case; (2) no conflict with 
the normal exploitation of the work; and (3) which does not 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the 
rightsholder.135 
On the surface, the foregoing means that there is no possibility 
for national courts to go beyond what the wording of the copyright 
exception and the three-step test enable, even where freedom of 
expression concerns would otherwise speak in favor of permitting 
the use of the copyrighted work in question. Yet, the CJEU 
continued that even though Article 5 provides “exceptions and 
limitations,” they give rights to users and the aim of this Article is 
to ensure a fair balance between rights and interests of 
rightsholders and rights and interests of users of protectable subject 
matter. Therefore, a national court must apply an interpretation of 
these exceptions in a manner that ensures their effectiveness and 
the observance of fundamental rights. The CJEU also highlighted 
that even though intellectual property is protected under the 
Charter, there is nothing to suggest that it would be an absolute 
right.136 
 
 133 Spiegel Online GmbH, EUR-Lex CELEX 62017CC0516; Funke Medien 
NRW GmbH, EUR-Lex CELEX 62017CC0469.  
 134 Spiegel Online GmbH at ¶¶ 41, 48; Pelham & Others at ¶¶ 58, 64; Funke 
Medien NRW GmbH at ¶¶ 56, 63. 
 135 Spiegel Online GmbH at ¶¶ 37, 53, 59; Funke Medien NRW GmbH at ¶¶ 
48, 52, 69, 76. 
 136 Spiegel Online GmbH at ¶¶ 46, 51–56, 59; Funke Medien NRW GmbH at 
¶¶ 52, 67–72, 76. 
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These copyright cases may provide some guidance on how the 
freedom of expression exception would be treated under the Trade 
Secret Directive, leading to constitutional balancing between 
various fundamental rights and interests within the E.U. However, 
a balancing requirement is arguably greater under the Trade Secret 
Directive due to various provisions that are more direct and 
intentional in ensuring freedom of expression and whistleblowing. 
For instance, in the Trade Secret Directive, there is an explicit and 
generally worded freedom of expression provision that is more 
clearly communicated when compared to the situation under the 
Information Society Directive, where freedom of expression is 
merely to be taken into account when interpreting the particularly 
worded exceptions.137 Further, as indicated above, the 
interpretation under the Information Society Directive is curtailed 
by a number of factors, as the interpretation must be consistent 
with the wording of an explicit exception as well as with the three-
step test, even when the specific exception and the situation at 
hand are tightly connected to fundamental rights.138 No such 
requirements exist in the Trade Secret Directive. Therefore, it 
seems likely that the scope of the freedom of expression provision 
under the Trade Secret Directive will be applied more liberally 
than under the Information Society Directive, as further discussed 
below. 
B. Freedom of Expression and Press Under the First Amendment 
to the U.S. Constitution 
Freedom of expression is defined in the U.S. by the U.S. 
Constitution and the constitutions of each state, as well as by 
related federal and state laws. In this article, we focus on the First 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution which states, in pertinent part, 
that: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people . . . to petition the 
Government for redress of grievances.”139 It is a restriction on the 
actions of government (a so-called negative right) that requires 
some form of recognized “state action” and, unlike its E.U. 
 
 137 Discussed infra, notes 186–91. 
 138 Spiegel Online GmbH at ¶ 59; Funke Medien NRW GmbH at ¶ 76. 
 139 U.S. Const. amend I. 
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counterpart, is not stated as a positive right. However, although 
limited in this manner, the First Amendment has broad reach as it 
has been held applicable to many types of government actions, 
both at the state and federal level.140 Thus, free speech and freedom 
of the press concerns can arise in the U.S. whenever the 
application or enforcement of law risks quelling freedom of 
expression. 
The required “state action” can take many forms; the most 
obvious are the adoption and enforcement of laws or regulations 
that restrict speech. Less obvious are court orders. Any court order 
or remedy in the U.S., whether issued by a federal or state tribunal 
and including the grant of preliminary relief, can constitute a 
restriction on freedom of speech or the press, and even if it 
involves the enforcement of private covenants.141 Additionally, the 
U.S. Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment can be the 
basis for a defense in cases where the alleged wrongful behavior 
involves speech.142 Thus, issues related to freedom of speech and 
press and the right to petition the government can arise in 
information related lawsuits when the activities of the defendant 
involve the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment and when 
the remedies sought would restrain the exercise of those rights. For 
example, a First Amendment defense has been successfully 
asserted with respect to invasion of privacy claims143 and trade 
secret misappropriation claims.144 In copyright cases in the U.S., 
the issue is part of the fair use analysis, with the U.S. Supreme 
Court noting that U.S. copyright law is saved from First 
 
 140 Fusaro v. Cogan, 930 F.3d 241, 246 (4th Cir. 2019) (“That short but 
forceful phrase has given rise to a complex array of legal protections for free 
expression which the courts have flexibly applied to a variety of 
circumstances.”). 
 141 See Shelly v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
 142 See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50–51 (1988) 
(finding that a First Amendment defense could be asserted against an intentional 
infliction of emotional distress claim). 
 143 See, e.g., Ross v. Midwest Communications, Inc., 870 F.2d 271 (5th Cir. 
1989); Machleder v. Diaz, 801 F.2d 46, 53 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 144 See, e.g., CBS, Inc. v. Davis, 510 U.S. 1315 (1994); Procter & Gamble Co. 
v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219 (6th Cir. 1996). 
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Amendment scrutiny due to the existence of the fair use limitation 
on copyright protection.145 
Like E.U. law, described above, there are many different 
aspects to U.S. First Amendment jurisprudence and the analysis is 
highly contextual. From the text of the First Amendment, it is clear 
it was designed to preclude government restrictions on those who 
wish to speak orally, in print, or through the use of the press. But 
the First Amendment has also been interpreted to protect: the rights 
of listeners146 and readers;147 the ability to distribute literature;148 
the anonymity of speakers;149 and whistleblowers (discussed in 
more detail in Part V). Also, as previously noted, it is the basis for 
a right of access to judicial proceedings.150 
A central premise of the First Amendment is that the 
dissemination of more information is an essential feature of a 
 
 145 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003); Harper & Row, 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985). 
 146 Martin v. City of Struthers, Ohio, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943); Va. St. Bd. of 
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976) 
(“[T]he protection afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its 
recipients both.”). 
 147 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (“If the First Amendment 
means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone 
in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch. Our 
whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the 
power to control men’s minds.”). Contra, United States v. Am. Library Assn., 
Inc., 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (holding that Congress can direct federal funds to 
direct a policy for libraries to protect against Internet access to pornographic or 
obscene materials, as Congress was not regulating private conduct, but 
conditioning the receipt of federal funds). 
 148 Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938) (“The liberty of the press is not 
confined to newspapers and periodicals. It necessarily embraces pamphlets and 
leaflets.”). 
 149 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 358 (1995) (Thomas, 
J., concurring) (“Founding-era Americans opposed attempts to require that 
anonymous authors reveal their identities on the ground that forced disclosure 
violated the ‘freedom of the press.’”); see also Victoria Smith Ekstrand & 
Cassandra Imfeld Jeyaram, Our Founding Anonymity: Anonymous Speech 
During the Constitutional Debate, 28 AM. JOURNALISM 35, 53 (2011) (stating 
that anonymous speech is “inextricably linked” to the revolution and founding of 
the US). 
 150 See supra notes 48–52 and accompanying text. 
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democracy, the best cure for undesirable speech, and is necessary 
to create a “marketplace of ideas.” The first reference in a U.S. 
Supreme Court case to the “free trade in ideas” within “the 
competition of the market” appears in Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes Jr.’s dissent in Abrams v. United States,151 but it has since 
been adopted by the Supreme Court and restated in numerous 
cases.152 This core principle has been held applicable to many laws, 
even those that were aimed at curbing what many deem to be 
hateful speech, such as that of the Ku Klux Klan153 and cross 
burning.154 Thus, this approach is different from the approach 
under the ECHR, as under the ECHR regime hate speech would 
not be protectable under freedom of speech principles due to the 
fact that it conflicts with other stated fundamental rights.155 But 
despite its breadth, the First Amendment is not without limits; 
restraints on speech and the press are allowed in some limited 
situations which often require courts to consider and balance 
competing interests. 
Whether restrictions on speech and of the press are allowed 
under the First Amendment depends upon a number of factors, 
including the category of speech involved (for instance, political, 
religious, and commercial) and, consequently, the level of scrutiny 
 
 151 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting); see also Whitney v. Cal., 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring). 
 152 See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) 
(citing Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (“It is the 
purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas 
in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization 
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licensee.”); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); Abrams v. 
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 153 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); NAACP v. Claiborne 
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (“This Court has made clear, however, that 
mere advocacy of the use of force or violence does not remove speech from the 
protection of the First Amendment.”). 
 154 See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003). 
 155 See also Oreste Pollicino & Marco Bassini, Free Speech, Defamation and 
the Limits to Freedom of Expression in the EU: A Comparative Analysis, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON EU INTERNET LAW 508 (A. Savin & J. Trzaskowski 
eds., 2014). 
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that is applied to the challenged government restriction.156 For 
instance, “the First Amendment does not prevent restrictions 
directed at commerce or conduct from imposing incidental burdens 
on speech.”157 This is similar to the European approach discussed 
above. However, the type of speech is not all that is considered. 
The wording of the challenged laws is also critical, with 
restrictions that are content-based being more suspect than those 
that are content-neutral. The U.S. Supreme Court recently 
explained in National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. 
Becerra: “[a]s a general matter, such laws ‘are presumptively 
unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government 
proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state 
interests.’”158 Governments can always attempt to justify the 
challenged restriction(s), but if the court is required to engage in 
“strict scrutiny,” or even “heightened scrutiny,” it is often difficult 
for state and federal governments to establish that the regulation or 
restriction at issue is necessary and narrowly tailored to serve the 
required substantial or compelling state interest. 
A related principle of U.S. First Amendment jurisprudence 
concerns the imposition of so-called “prior restraints,” which are 
highly disfavored;159 a principle which is often invoked in cases 
involving anticipated press coverage that will disclose otherwise 
confidential information. The Supreme Court explained in New 
York Times Co. v. United States: “[a]ny system of prior restraints 
of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption 
 
 156 Victoria L Killion, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF11072 THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT: CATEGORIES OF SPEECH (2019). 
 157 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 567 (2011). The standard for 
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against its constitutional validity.”160 This rule has been applied to 
invalidate restrictions on speech even in cases where the source 
illegally or improperly obtained the subject information. In such 
cases, the rights of the press and the interests of the public in the 
information can override any interest in privacy or secrecy, even if 
the information was wrongfully acquired by others. The U.S. 
Supreme Court explained: 
[T]his Court upheld the press’ right to publish information of great 
public concern obtained from documents stolen by a third party. In so 
doing, this Court focused on the stolen documents’ character and the 
consequences of public disclosure, not on the fact that the documents 
were stolen.161 
Thus, “publication of truthful information of public concern,” 
however the source acquired it, cannot be sanctioned without 
giving rise to First Amendment concerns. This approach is similar 
to the case law under the ECHR that was previously discussed 
where the press was allowed to impart information even though the 
subject information was obtained due to a breach of secrecy.162 But 
whether free expression concerns will prevail depends upon the 
specific facts of each case, particularly with respect to the 
importance of the information to be revealed. 
One area of U.S. First Amendment jurisprudence that is not as 
protective as the E.U. principles governing freedom of expression 
concerns the ability of members of the press to protect the 
identities of confidential sources through the exercise of what is 
known in the U.S. as the “reporter’s privilege.” As previously 
discussed above, in Branzburg v. Hayes163 four members of the 
U.S. Supreme Court refused to recognize a reporter’s privilege in a 
case where a reporter refused to testify before grand juries 
concerning stories he had written about illegal drugs. However, 
since that decision in 1972, the reporter’s privilege has been 
successfully asserted in numerous state and federal cases in the 
 
 160 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (quoting 
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (the “Pentagon Papers” 
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 162 See Dupuis & Others v. France, 2007 Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 1914/02. 
 163 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
MAR. 2020] Trade Secrets and the Right to Information 39 
U.S., in part due to the suggestion of Justice Powell in his 
concurrence in Branzburg that a balancing approach is needed,164 
but also because forty-nine U.S. states and the District of Columbia 
have adopted state laws (known as shield laws) which recognize a 
qualified reporter’s privilege.165 
In the U.S., the First Amendment has been raised in a number 
of IP cases, including in trade secret cases.166 Often, the trade 
secret cases involve the rights of the press with respect to the 
publication of information of public concern where the defendant 
member of the press or media organization had nothing to do with 
the initial (allegedly wrongful) acquisition of the information. 
Indeed, in the U.S., the Constitutional interest in freedom of the 
press is often directly protected by the fact that the defendant did 
not have the requisite “knowledge or reason to know” that the 
information was a trade secret that had been misappropriated.167 
Thus, as a practical matter, freedom of expression is protected by 
the limited definition of “misappropriation” under the UTSA and 
DTSA. The harder cases are when the defendant member of the 
press (or other third party) either knew about the trade secret 
misappropriation at the time of its publication of the information, 
or actively encouraged it. 
Often the outcome in cases involving the alleged 
misappropriation of information by the press is a matter of timing 
and remedy sought, particularly where the plaintiff and putative 
trade secret owner seeks preliminary relief, a form of prior 
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restraint. In CBS, Inc. v. Davis, for instance, Justice Brennan, 
sitting as the Circuit Justice, granted an emergency stay of a 
preliminary injunction that would have prevented the airing of a 
television show concerning the meat processing practices of a meat 
packing company, even though CBS was involved in the initial 
(and alleged improper) acquisition of the subject information.168 
Justice Brennan explained: “[e]ven where questions of allegedly 
urgent national security, or competing constitutional interests, are 
concerned, we have imposed this ‘most extraordinary remed[y]’ 
only where the evil that would result from the reportage is both 
great and certain and cannot be mitigated by less intrusive 
measures.”169 Similarly, in Ford Motor Co. v. Lane,170 a federal 
district court in Michigan rejected Ford’s request for a preliminary 
injunction in conjunction with its trade secret misappropriation 
claims because the requested order constituted an unjustified prior 
restraint.  
Similar principles apply to whistleblowers in the U.S. where 
their rights to express themselves and petition the government have 
both a Constitutional and statutory dimension; Constitutional 
because of the First Amendment values of free expression 
discussed above and statutory because there are numerous federal 
and state statutes that provide varying types and degrees of 
protection for different categories of whistleblowers.171 For 
instance, the first federal whistleblower law was adopted by the 
U.S. Congress in 1863 in response to substandard supplies 
provided to the Union Army during the Civil War, and recent 
legislation has sought to strengthen such laws.172 More recently, the 
federal Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 was enacted to 
protect certain federal government employees from retaliation for 
disclosing information, under specified conditions, concerning 
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 171 See, e.g., The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, 5 U.S.C. 2302(b) 
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“any violation of any law, rule, or regulation” or “gross 
mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a 
substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.”173 
The Constitutional origins of whistleblower rights in the U.S. is 
often traced to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1968 decision in 
Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School District 
205, which involved the dismissal of a teacher for publicly 
criticizing the Board’s handling of previous tax increases.174 Noting 
that public employment did not require employees to give up their 
First Amendment rights, but that there may be legitimate reasons 
for government employers to curtail such speech, the Court stated 
that: “[t]he problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between 
the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon 
matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an 
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it 
performs through its employees.”175 It then proceeded to outline the 
interests that are relevant to the analysis, ultimately holding that 
“absent proof of false statements knowingly or recklessly made by 
him, a teacher’s exercise of his right to speak on issues of public 
importance may not furnish the basis for his dismissal from public 
employment.”176 The Supreme Court later explained in San Diego 
v. Roe: “[w]ere [public employees] not able to speak on [the 
operation of their employers], the community would be deprived of 
informed opinions on important public issues. The interest at stake 
is as much the public’s interest in receiving informed opinion as it 
is the employee’s own right to disseminate it.”177 
The ruling in Pickering has never been overruled, but it has 
been limited such that it is not as robust as some would like.178 This 
is due, in part, to the state action requirement of the First 
Amendment which means that the Pickering doctrine only applies 
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to public employees who are subjected to adverse employment 
consequences due to the exercise of their First Amendment rights. 
Additionally, it is clear from Pickering and its progeny that not all 
speech by public employees is protected by the First Amendment; 
the speech must deal with matters of “public concern,” and must be 
engaged in by a public employee in his capacity as a citizen.179 As 
the Court noted in the case establishing the latter limitation, 
Garcetti v. Ceballos: “the fact that Ceballos spoke as a prosecutor 
fulfilling a responsibility to advise his supervisor about how best to 
proceed with a pending case—distinguishes Ceballos’ case from 
those in which the First Amendment provides protection against 
discipline.”180 
Since Pickering and Garcetti, federal courts have developed 
jurisprudence to define matters of public concern and when a 
public employee is acting in his capacity as a citizen.181 For 
instance, in Lane v. Franks the Supreme Court explained that: 
“[t]he critical question under Garcetti is whether the speech at 
issue is itself ordinarily within the scope of an employee’s duties, 
not whether it merely concerns those duties.”182 Thus, testimony 
that was given by a public employee in response to a subpoena in a 
criminal corruption trial was held to be protected by the First 
Amendment. Additionally, as previously noted, numerous state and 
federal whistleblower statutes have been adopted that provide 
greater protection for whistleblowers than the U.S. Constitution 
requires, including a new law that applies specifically to trade 
secrets, as further described in Part V below. However, these laws 
often include special limitations or procedural rules related to 
information that is deemed to concern issues of national security. 
For instance, the federal Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 
does not extend to employees of U.S. agencies that are a part of the 
intelligence community, as defined;183 the more limited 
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Intelligence Community Whistleblower Act of 1998184 applies to 
those employees. 
V. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND WHISTLEBLOWING AS 
‘EXCEPTIONS’ FOR TRADE SECRETS IN THE E.U. AND THE US 
While the foregoing demonstrates the concerns of the E.U. and 
U.S. with respect to the right to information, freedom of 
expression, and whistleblowing, how these concerns are 
manifested in the respective trade secret laws differ noticeably. 
This is due in part to the fact that most E.U.-member states follow 
the civil law tradition. Thus, exceptions and limitations to trade 
secret protection in the E.U. are written directly into the Trade 
Secret Directive, whereas in the U.S. many of the applicable 
exceptions and limitations can only be found in ancillary laws and 
legal principles. The following sub-parts detail these differences. 
A. How E.U. Trade Secret Directive Addresses These 
‘Exceptions’ 
Article 5 of the Trade Secret Directive sets forth four 
exceptions for trade secret protection, the following two of which 
relate directly to the present discussion: 
Member States shall ensure that an application for the measures, 
procedures and remedies provided for in this Directive is dismissed 
where the alleged acquisition, use or disclosure of the trade secret was 
carried out in any of the following cases: 
(a) for exercising the right to freedom of expression and information as 
set out in the Charter, including respect for the freedom and pluralism 
of the media;   
(b) for revealing misconduct, wrongdoing or illegal activity, provided 
that the respondent acted for the purpose of protecting the general 
public interest; . . .185 
The preamble to the Trade Secret Directive further clarifies the 
meaning of Article 5. It states that: “it is essential that the exercise 
of the right to freedom of expression and information which 
encompasses media freedom and pluralism, as reflected in Article 
 
 184 Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998, 105 Pub. 
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11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
(‘the Charter’), not be restricted, in particular with regard to 
investigative journalism and the protection of journalistic 
sources.”186 Furthermore, preamble 20 provides: “The measures, 
procedures and remedies provided for in this Directive should not 
restrict whistleblowing activity. Therefore, the protection of trade 
secrets should not extend to cases in which disclosure of a trade 
secret serves the public interest, insofar as directly relevant 
misconduct, wrongdoing or illegal activity is revealed.”187 
The final wording of the whistleblowing provision is different 
to the one proposed by the Commission. In the initial version it 
was further required that the disclosure of the trade secret should 
be “necessary” for revealing the misconduct. The initial proposal 
was interpreted to mean that even though some disclosures would 
be in the public interest, they might not always be necessary.188 The 
final wording seems to set a somewhat more lenient requirement 
for disclosures.189 However, when read together with preamble 20, 
“insofar as directly relevant misconduct [] is revealed,” the end 
result of the interpretation comes very close to the initial wording 
of Article 5 (b).190 
Some have been concerned that whistleblowers may still be in 
a vulnerable situation because they have the burden of proof that 
their disclosure activities are in the public interest.191 However, it 
should be recognized that in accordance with preamble 20, national 
authorities are allowed to apply the whistleblower exception also 
in cases where “the respondent had every reason to believe in good 
faith that his or her conduct satisfied the appropriate criteria set out 
 
 186 Trade Secret Directive, supra note 1, at preamble 19. 
 187 Trade Secret Directive, supra note 1, at preamble 20. 
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in this Directive.” Consequently, it seems that the burden of proof 
is not overly heavy, at least if this flexibility is utilized. Moreover, 
the personal scope of the applicability is not limited in any way. 
Therefore, it is applicable beyond work-related situations and 
extends both to private and public sectors. 
As previously noted, when analyzing the Trade Secret 
Directive and comparing it with the Information Society Directive, 
one might be puzzled that freedom of expression is provided as a 
direct exception to trade secret protection. Article 5(a) exempts 
remedies when acquisition, use or disclosure of the trade secret 
was carried out “for exercising the right to freedom of expression 
and information as set out in the Charter, including respect for the 
freedom and pluralism of the media.”192 This is very different from 
the exceptions provided in the Information Society Directive for 
copyright protection. One could, for example, find a freedom of 
expression fundamental right behind the parody exception for 
copyright (as the Deckmyn case discussed above illustrates), but 
none of the exceptions in the Information Society Directive 
implicate fundamental rights as directly as under the Trade Secret 
Directive. 
The case law of the CJEU on freedom of expression and 
copyright suggests that even though some legal provision under 
copyright legislation (or trade secret legislation) may be 
understood as an exception, it still has to be interpreted in a 
manner to give full effect to the rule and which would at the same 
fully adhere to the fundamental rights under the Charter, 
interpreted in the light of the ECtHR case law.193 Yet, the most 
recent case law from the CJEU in fact limits the room of 
interpretation in the copyright context in two important ways, as 
already discussed above. Firstly, the interpretation has to be in 
compliance with the wording of the specific exception. Secondly, 
the Member States need to apply the three-step test in accordance 
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with Article 5(5) of the Information Society Directive when 
implementing and interpreting copyright exceptions. 
In the Trade Secret Directive, there is no three-step test.194 The 
non-existence of the three-step test means that such an extra 
requirement in implementing and interpreting exceptions in the 
trade secret context is missing, allowing broader room for the 
exceptions. Moreover, Article 5(a) refers directly to the freedom of 
expression and information under the Charter. The provision itself 
does not have any other defining vocabulary. Rather, the provision 
seems to bring the freedom of expression and information 
fundamental right as such into the center of the Trade Secret 
Directive. This opens up the possibility to give the right to 
information in the trade secret context an effect that flows from the 
freedom of expression doctrine under the human rights 
instruments. The interpretations under the Trade Secret Directive 
may therefore develop more freely than what has been possible 
under the Information Society Directive. 
Consequently, the case law of the ECtHR becomes highly 
relevant when analyzing the operation of Article 5(a), even though 
the ECHR is not a legislative instrument of the E.U. As explained 
earlier, Article 11 of the Charter on freedom of expression is to be 
interpreted in compliance with Article 10 of the ECHR. Of 
particular importance is the ECtHR’s case law concerning 
journalistic activities and the cases where journalists have been 
entitled to reveal even confidential information. It is noteworthy 
that even the preamble text of the Trade Secret Directive highlights 
the importance of investigative journalism. 
The cases of the ECtHR concerning whistleblowing are 
likewise relevant when interpreting Article 5(b) of the Trade Secret 
Directive. Yet, Article 5(b) contains a more explicitly-worded 
exception, which sets some contours for implementation and 
interpretation. Some of these potential interpretations have been 
addressed above. Even though under the Trade Secret Directive 
these provisions, freedom of expression and whistleblowing, are 
mentioned as exceptions to trade secret protection, one should bear 
 
 194 Such test is not applicable to trade secrets even under the TRIPS 
Agreement, the Trade Secret Directive, the DTSA, or the UTSA. 
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in mind that under the ECHR, confidentiality is one of the 
legitimate reasons to limit freedom of expression, but the other 
requirements for such limitations discussed above need to be met 
too. Most importantly, the limitation must be “necessary in a 
democratic society[.]” 
The case law of the CJEU on copyrights highlights the need to 
seek a fair balance between different interests and between 
different fundamental rights, namely between protection of 
intellectual property and freedom of expression. Trade secrets are 
also protected under the protection of property ownership and 
limitations for property protection are also subject to certain rules 
under the ECHR. The notion of public interest becomes a decisive 
norm when considering what kinds of actions are deemed to be 
appropriate in limiting property rights. In some cases, it might be 
in the public interest to keep information confidential, and in some 
cases it would be more appropriate to disclose the information. For 
example, a threat to public health or environment would qualify as 
a legitimate reason for whistleblowing and freedom of expression. 
Yet the disclosure may only cover trade secrets to the extent that is 
necessary to the disclosure of the wrongdoing.195 Consequently, the 
Trade Secret Directive likewise seeks a balance between various 
interests and different fundamental rights. 
Some have argued that the open manner in which these 
exceptions are drafted would provide some flexibility for Members 
to design how to implement these provisions. This could 
potentially lead to discrepancies between various national level 
implementations.196 However, one should recognize that even 
though the Member States are allowed to provide more protection 
to trade secrets, the Directive generally specifies only a minimum 
harmonization of trade secret protection, and pursuant to Article 5 
Member States do not have discretion. Protection must be 
implemented as such under Article 1(1) of the Trade Secret 
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Directive. Furthermore, Members are bound to follow the case law 
of the ECtHR. Therefore, Members are not allowed to narrow 
down these provisions. 
Sections (c) and (d) of Article 5 of the Trade Secret Directive 
provide specific circumstances when disclosure is allowed under 
specific national or Union rules. These provisions seem to 
resemble more closely the detailed exception of whistleblowing as 
regulated in the U.S. All these exceptions are also connected to 
Article 1(2) of the Trade Secret Directive which sets the scope of 
protection and defines what is not protectable. Most importantly, 
Article 1(2) of the Trade Secret Directive provides “[t]his 
Directive shall not affect: (a) the exercise of the right to freedom of 
expression and information as set out in the Charter, including 
respect for the freedom and pluralism of the media.”197 This 
provision could likewise be interpreted as highlighting the 
importance of freedom of expression over the trade secret 
protection.198 Like U.S. trade secret law, the Trade Secret Directive 
includes many other rules which are designed to ensure the 
dissemination of information and the right to information. 
B. Specific Protection for Whistleblowers in the E.U. 
The E.U. adopted a Directive for the protection of 
whistleblowers (“Whistleblower Directive”) in April 2019.199 The 
objective of the Directive is to give further protection to 
whistleblowers to prevent breaches of law which are harmful to the 
public interest (Recital 1). The material scope of the Whistleblower 
Directive covers among others the following areas of E.U. law: 
food and feed safety, transport safety, consumer protection, nuclear 
safety, public health, environmental protection, public 
 
 197 Trade Secret Directive, supra note 1, at Article 1(2). 
 198 However, another way of understanding this provision is to give it a 
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procurement, financial services and protection of privacy (Article 
2). Thus, even though the Whistleblower Directive covers many 
areas of E.U. law, the approach is still sector specific, which is 
similar to the U.S. approach albeit in the U.S. there are different 
laws for different situations and sectors. 
Before the introduction of the Whistleblower Directive, some 
urged a need for a horizontal approach. But the E.U. does not have 
a power to legislate in all areas of law, which ruled out a horizontal 
approach.200 Moreover, the material scope of the Whistleblower 
Directive does not cover all breaches of Union law, but only 
breaches in the areas of Union law which are explicitly mentioned 
under Article 2. From the recitals of the Whistleblower Directive, 
one can learn that areas selected are the ones where breaches may 
cause serious harm to public interest and welfare of society.201 
However, E.U. Member States are allowed to extend the 
application of the Directive to other areas of law. Moreover, the 
Whistleblower Directive does not have an impact on legislation 
already at place in the Member States for reporting wrongdoings in 
some specific areas of law. 
Under Article 21(7) of the Whistleblower Directive, if there is 
a need to disclose trade secrets, when reporting or disclosing 
information, which falls within the scope of the Whistleblower 
Directive, such disclosures are considered to be lawful disclosures 
under Article 3(2) of the Trade Secret Directive. Consequently, the 
Whistleblower Directive is a lex specialis within the scope of the 
Whistleblower Directive. However, these two Directives are 
understood as complementing each other and it is clearly 
highlighted that when cases do not belong to the scope of the 
Whistleblower Directive, the exceptions provided in the Trade 
Secret Directive remain applicable (Recital 100); for instance, 
freedom of expression exceptions may apply. However, the 
introduction of the Whistleblower Directive may have an impact 
on interpretations of the Trade Secret Directive. For example, the 
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material scope of the Whistleblower Directive can provide some 
guidance when analyzing when there is a public interest in 
disclosing misconduct, wrongdoing or illegal activity under the 
Trade Secret Directive. But the interpretation of the exceptions in 
the Trade Secret Directive should not become more limited, even 
though there might be less need to rely on provisions of the Trade 
Secret Directive, as the material and the personal scopes of the 
Whistleblower Directive are very broad. 
The personal scope of the Whistleblower Directive is quite all-
encompassing. Even though the provision refers to the persons 
who learn the information in work-related situations, the 
definitions applied also cover job-applicants, trainees, freelancers, 
sub-contractors and different type of collaborators who could face 
some harmful consequences due to disclosures. In addition, it is 
applicable both to public and private sectors (Article 4). Also, in 
the Trade Secret Directive the personal scope of the 
whistleblowing provision is wide, but it has been reached through 
defining the exception to cover the disclosure activity without 
making any reference to the personal scope of the exception. 
In accordance with the Whistleblower Directive, Member 
States are obligated to set up procedures for internal and external 
reporting. The Whistleblower Directive clearly refers to and draws 
upon the ECtHR’s practice on this issue (Recital 32). Under the 
Trade Secret Directive, the recitals only referred to the Charter 
provisions, but in the Whistleblower Directive there is a direct 
reference also to the ECHR. Moreover, one can see the impact of 
the ECtHR’s case law in the structuring of the internal and external 
reporting channels. How an entity’s internal reporting channels and 
relevant public authorities should be preferred before disclosing 
the wrongdoing to the general public seems to stem from the case 
law of the ECtHR. This preference is also illustrated in the cases 
discussed above. The disclosure to the public should always be the 
last resort. However, the Directive also provides some flexibility 
for cases when these preferred reporting channels are deemed to be 
impractical. In such cases the wrongdoings could be reported 
directly to the public. 
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Article 15 sets up specific conditions when public disclosures 
are allowed. First, one is allowed to disclose information to the 
public, if they first have used internal and/or external reporting 
channels, but there has been no action taken within the timeframes 
set in the Whistleblower Directive. Moreover, one is allowed to 
disclose information to the public when one has reasonable 
grounds to believe that there is an imminent or manifest danger to 
the public interest. Likewise, public disclosure is allowed in cases 
of external reporting if one believes that because of the specific 
circumstances of the case there is a risk of retaliation or low 
prospect of the case being addressed, such as that evidence may be 
concealed or destroyed or that an authority is in collusion with the 
perpetrator of the breach or involved in the breach. This provision 
defines the conditions in a quite detailed manner. 
Under the case law of the ECtHR, one is entitled to public 
disclosures in cases where alternative ways of disclosure are 
considered “clearly impractical.”202 The requirements under the 
Whistleblower Directive seem to be in compliance with this case 
law and in any case the requirements need to be interpreted and 
implemented in such a manner. These more detailed provisions of 
the Whistleblower Directive can also provide some guidance on 
interpretations for the Trade Secret Directive. 
In addition to the aforementioned rules of priority, there is a 
possibility to disclose directly to the press in accordance with the 
specific national rules that set up a system protecting freedom of 
expression and information.203 In Recital 46 it is highlighted that 
whistleblowers are especially important for investigative 
journalism and therefore providing protection for whistleblowers 
also facilitates disclosures to the media.204 This way, the watchdog 
role of the media is protected. Article 15(2) of direct disclosure to 
the press was not part of the initial proposal for the Whistleblower 
Directive, but was included at a very late stage in the legislative 
procedure.205 This addition is laudable as otherwise the 
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Whistleblower Directive would have potentially narrowed media’s 
possibilities to receive information and enable public discourse 
over important issues, having a clear impact on freedom of 
expression.206 Now the distinction is drawn between disclosure to 
general public and disclosure to the press. Disclosure to the public 
is the last resort after the order of priority described above is 
followed and subject to the specific conditions. But disclosure to 
the press can take place without such specific conditions. 
In Finland, the Act on the Exercise of Freedom of Expression 
in Mass Media (460/2003) provides rules on editorial 
responsibility and confidentiality of information sources. It seems 
likely that this type of legislation qualifies as specific national rules 
mentioned in Article 15(2) of the Whistleblower Directive. As the 
press needs to follow their specific rules and journalistic ethics 
before publishing some information, the reputation of business 
entities is not unduly risked through this information flow.207 The 
confidentiality of information sources also protects 
whistleblowers.208 Consequently, disclosure to the press under this 
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type of national rules can be argued to reach the same objective as 
the other detailed priority rules on disclosure under the 
Whistleblower Directive. Moreover, this provision ensures that the 
Whistleblower Directive respects fully the freedom of expression 
and information under the ECHR Article 10.209 The flexibility 
between different reporting channels is also in line with the 
Council of Europe’s recommendation on the protection of 
whistleblowers.210 
C. How the U.S. has Reconciled Freedom of Expression and 
Trade Secret Protection 
While some of the interpretations of the U.S. Constitution’s 
right of free speech resemble the end results that have been 
reached under the ECHR, as elaborated previously in this article, 
the possibility of relying on these rules (as well as other ancillary 
limiting doctrines) may not be very obvious to the parties to a case. 
Unlike the Trade Secret Directive, no provision of the DTSA or the 
UTSA specifically mentions freedom of expression as an issue to 
be considered in trade secret cases. Nonetheless, as discussed 
above, it is clear under U.S. law that where the assertion of trade 
secret rights would restrain free speech or freedom of the press, a 
First Amendment argument (often framed as a “defense”) may be 
asserted.211 Additionally, both the DTSA and UTSA (as adopted in 
each state) may be challenged as unconstitutional on First 
Amendment grounds, particularly as applied. However, although 
information diffusion through free speech and freedom of the 
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values in the U.S., whether a First Amendment argument will 
succeed in a trade secret misappropriation case depends upon a 
number of factors, including the wrongfulness of the defendant’s 
behavior and the public importance of the information to be 
conveyed. 
The most obvious reason why a First Amendment defense does 
not always work in trade secret cases in the U.S. is because not all 
acts that constitute trade secret misappropriation have a 
communicative aspect. Under both the UTSA and the DTSA, trade 
secret information may be wrongfully acquired and used without 
there ever being any communication of the trade secrets to others, 
particularly publicly. For instance, although a competitor may 
wrongfully acquire trade secret information, it may only use it 
internally and never disclose it outside the confines of its own 
business. For this reason, the trade secret cases in the U.S. where a 
First Amendment defense has been asserted are rare, and they 
usually involve speech by the press on a matter of public concern 
in situations where the involved journalist was not involved in the 
initial misappropriation of the subject information.212 It is much 
more rare for the person who directly misappropriated alleged 
trade secrets to assert a First Amendment defense, but the First 
Amendment should be raised whenever the remedy sought would 
quell speech, particularly if the information at issue concerns a 
matter of great public concern. 
When a journalist is more directly involved in the alleged trade 
secret misappropriation, then a clearer conflict arises between 
freedom of the press and the goals of tort law. As summarized by 
Richard Epstein, historically the goals of tort law often prevailed 
over First Amendment concerns: 
For most of [U.S.] constitutional history it was difficult to detect any 
real tension between the common law principle of defamation (and, one 
may add, privacy) and the First Amendment. The usual reconciliation 
of the two principles was that the law of defamation was concerned 
with false speech to the discredit of the plaintiff, which, being 
wrongful, received no constitutional protection at all.213 
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But part of the reason is because there are numerous free 
speech and free press safety-valves built into U.S. trade secret law 
(and IP law more generally) that serve to balance information 
protection against the U.S. policy of information diffusion. 
Professor Pamela Samuelson identified the following trade secret 
principles: (1) reverse engineering; (2) preemption as a check on 
trade secret law; (3) accidental disclosure; (4) limits on third party 
liability; and (5) trade secret interests may be overridden by other 
societal interests.214 This list can be supplemented by: (6) the 
limited definition of a trade secret, including the principle that 
general skill and knowledge is not protected and the requirement of 
“independent economic value”; (7) the principle of independent 
development; (8) the knowledge or reason of know standard of 
misappropriation; (9) the role of equitable considerations is the 
decision to grant injunctive relief; and (10) the applicable 
whistleblower immunity principles and statutes. 
As an apparent consequence of the free speech and free press 
safety-valves (and other limitations on coverage) that are built into 
U.S. trade secret law, a public interest exception to trade secret 
protection is not well-developed. It is briefly mentioned in the 
commentary to the UTSA and the Restatement (Third) of Unfair 
Competition, but without much explication.215 Often, where a 
public interest limitation is discussed is with respect to requests for 
injunctive relief or protective orders when courts must consider 
common law equitable principles and where a rich body of 
jurisprudence that considers the public interest exists.216 Indeed, the 
case cited in the UTSA commentary for the proposition that there 
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is a public interest exception to trade secret law, Republic Aviation 
v. Schenk, involved the request for a permanent injunction in a 
trade secret case that was brought during the Vietnam War. The 
court noted: “In determining the advisability of granting the 
plaintiff the sweeping injunctive relief sought in the action, factors 
extrinsic of the record must be considered. Those factors are the 
interests of the public, the armed services and national security.”217 
As a result of the foregoing, it is not that U.S. courts are not 
charged with considering the public interest in trade secret cases. 
Rather, what is missing in U.S. law that is explicit in the Trade 
Secret Directive is a list of specific (but not necessarily, exclusive) 
matters of public interest that should be considered as part of trade 
secret litigation in the U.S., including: (1) free speech and freedom 
of the press; (2) free competition; (3) employee mobility; (4) 
regulatory oversight; (5) the rights of collective organizations 
(unions); and (6) personal privacy interests. As a practical matter, 
defendants in trade secret cases must raise these issues for them to 
be considered, and many courts in the U.S. have been receptive to 
these interests when raised. Indeed, as previously noted, some of 
these issues have been raised in trade secret cases in the U.S. to 
limit the scope (if not deny the grant of) both preliminary and 
permanent injunctive relief. 
E. Whistleblowing as Specific Exceptions for Trade Secrets in the 
U.S. 
Given the limited scope of the First Amendment free speech 
rights of public employees, as described above, statutory 
protections for such employees and other whistleblowers (usually 
the employees of public contractors) is important and exists at both 
the state and federal level in the U.S. pursuant to various common 
law principles, statutes, and regulations.218 While each 
whistleblower law and regulation in the U.S. is different in scope, 
focus, and specifics, the general purpose of these laws is to 
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encourage employees of government agencies and government 
contractors to provide information about suspected wrongdoing 
and illegal behavior, often by specifying the means of disclosure 
and providing protection from retaliation. Generally, alleged 
wrongdoing is a proper subject for whistleblowing behavior if it: 
(1) concerns a financial loss to the government; (2) constitutes a 
violation of law, or (3) causes harm to employees or the general 
public. However, the disclosure of information alleged to 
constitute classified information may subject the person disclosing 
the information to prosecution under the federal Espionage Act, 
making a decision to engage in whistleblowing particularly 
difficult for employees of the intelligence community, as defined. 
The applicability of U.S. whistleblowing rules principally to 
public employees and employees of public contractors is different 
from the European approach, as the European approach makes no 
distinction between employees in the public and private sector. For 
example, in the case Heinisch v. Germany, explained earlier, 
misconduct was taking place in a private enterprise.219 However, 
under U.S. law, there is nothing to prevent private citizens from 
reporting government wrongdoing provided their actions in doing 
so are not illegal or tortious.220 Indeed, as noted previously, the 
First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution includes the right to 
petition the government. Additionally, U.S. First Amendment 
jurisprudence offers protection to private citizens charged with 
defamation if the plaintiffs are public officials, public figures, or 
the matters discussed are of public concern221 and some U.S. 
whistleblower statutes apply to private citizens, for example the 
whistleblower provisions of the UTSA. 
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More directly, the new DTSA whistleblower provisions create 
an immunity for trade secret misappropriation which is applicable 
in both civil and criminal cases whether brought in state or federal 
court. Known as the “whistleblower defense” or the 
“whistleblower immunity,” it is based upon the public’s interest in 
learning about illegal behavior. However, the DTSA whistleblower 
provision is very specific, as its three parts, which are revealed in 
the amended Section 1833 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code. 
The first part of the DTSA whistleblower provision details the 
immunity that individuals enjoy under the statute, as follows: 
(b) Immunity from liability for confidential disclosure of a trade secret 
to the government or in a court filing. 
(1) Immunity. An individual shall not be held criminally or civilly 
liable under any Federal or State trade secret law for the disclosure of a 
trade secret that— 
(A) is made— 
(i) in confidence to a Federal, State, or local government official, 
either directly or indirectly, or to an attorney; and 
(ii) solely for the purpose of reporting or investigating a suspected 
violation of law; or 
(B) is made in a complaint or other document filed in a lawsuit or other 
proceeding, if such filing is made under seal.222 
As so worded, it only allows for the information to be disclosed 
to specified individuals “in confidence” and, if made in a 
document filed in a lawsuit, it must be made “under seal.”223 The 
DTSA does not define what the two quoted terms mean, but the 
rules of many federal and state courts specify the procedures for 
filing a document under seal. 
The second part of the DTSA’s whistleblower provision 
concerns disclosures within the context of retaliation lawsuits. 
These are often brought by whistleblowers when they are 
terminated by their employers for disclosing information to 
government officials, often based upon state or federal statutes that 
allow such lawsuits. It provides: 
(2) USE OF TRADE SECRET INFORMATION IN ANTI-
RETALIATION LAWSUIT. An individual who files a lawsuit for 
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retaliation by an employer for reporting a suspected violation of law 
may disclose the trade secret to the attorney of the individual and use 
the trade secret information in the court proceeding, if the individual— 
(A) files any document containing the trade secret under seal; and 
(B) does not disclose the trade secret, except pursuant to court order.224 
As already noted, a separate body of state and federal law, 
usually in the form of court rules, defines what it means to file 
information “under seal.” 
The third part of the DTSA’s whistleblower provision is a 
penalty, of sorts, and is of particular import to employers because 
it requires that employees be given notice of the whistleblower 
immunity. Prior to the adoption of this aspect of the DTSA, some 
U.S. whistleblower laws require employers to be give notice to 
their employees of whistleblowing rights, but others did not. With 
respect to trade secret information, this provision fills those 
loopholes and provides that failure to give the required notice will 
adversely affect the availability of remedies in trade secret actions 
against employees. 
While helpful as an explicit limitation on liability for trade 
secret misappropriation under U.S. law, the DTSA whistleblowing 
provision is limited in scope when compared to the European rules 
as it only allows disclosures to government or to the courts in 
specified situations and does not cover disclosures to the general 
public or to the press. Other legal principles for the protection of 
freedom of expression and whistleblowing, where they exist, must 
be resorted to in such situations. So, it seems that E.U. rules, both 
under the Trade Secret Directive and the Whistleblower Directive, 
provide more security and clarity to whistleblowers and 
consequently ensure more efficient public access to information. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Although the United States and European Union approach 
issues of freedom of expression and whistleblowing differently, 
they have a lot to learn from one another. Looking through the lens 
of U.S. trade secret law, upon which the Trade Secret Directive is 
based, many of the public interest concerns that animated the 
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debates that led to the enactment of the Directive can be 
ameliorated if E.U. countries properly and fully apply the 
limitations on the scope of trade secret rights that are a part of a 
prima facie claim of trade secret misappropriation. From an E.U. 
perspective, the U.S. could do a much better job of articulating the 
sorts of public interest concerns that should limit liability or the 
grant of injunctive relief in trade secret cases, perhaps even 
amending the UTSA and DTSA to expressly list exceptions to 
protection. 
In essence, it seems that E.U. rules under the Trade Secret 
Directive on freedom of expression and whistleblowing provide 
broader and more explicit access to information of public concern 
when compared to the situation under U.S. law. First, the 
whistleblowing provisions of the Trade Secret and Whistleblower 
Directives are not as detailed and restricted as their counterparts in 
the United States. Second, the non-existence of an express freedom 
of expression provision in U.S. trade secret law may limit the 
application of this fundamental right in trade secret cases for the 
simple and practical reason that it is not seen as a critical 
limitation. In contrast, the E.U. counterpart has an explicit rule 
highlighting freedom of expression and information as 
fundamental rights in the trade secret context; a rule that is even 
stronger than its counterpart under E.U. copyright law. 
Additionally, the preamble text of the Directive also refers to the 
fundamental rights under the Charter, which further emphasize the 
need to balance the right to information, and fundamental rights 
more generally, against trade secret protection. 
Moreover, when considering the public interest in information, 
courts need not make a binary choice to either protect trade secrets 
or not. There is a middle ground that courts can utilize to ensure 
that disclosed (or shared) information does not result in the waiver 
of trade secrecy. In fact, this middle ground is used frequently in 
trade secret litigation when courts issue protective orders designed 
to limit the use and disclosure of trade secret information in such 
contexts and is an explicit part of the Trade Secret Directive. Thus, 
for instance, if the circumstances indicate that the public’s interest 
in certain information outweighs the trade secret owner’s interests 
in secrecy, the subject information might be shared with a few 
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individuals, such as government regulators, pursuant to an order 
that they keep the information confidential. Government officials 
often receive information from individuals and businesses that they 
promise to keep confidential. Also, both U.S. and E.U. law allow 
for so-called “royalty injunctions” in lieu of injunctive relief that 
would preclude the disclosure and use of information. This type of 
middle ground approach is also a feature of the whistleblowing 
provisions both in the United States and European Union. 
This article discussed the significance the freedom of 
expression and whistleblowing rules have in enabling the human 
right to access information, which is a cornerstone of a democratic 
society. The article elaborated their specific role in the human 
rights context but also in the trade secret context, notwithstanding 
the apparent conflict between the two principles and the trade 
secret protection. From the foregoing, one could learn a number of 
important factors that emerge for consideration when balancing 
freedom of expression and the right to information against trade 
secret rights. These include: the nature of the information (in 
particular, whether it actually qualifies for trade secret protection); 
how the defendant in a trade secret case acquired and plans to use 
the information, if at all; and the public’s interest (and by 
extension, the interest of the press) in the subject information. 
Most importantly under the balancing approach advocated in 
this article, one should bear in mind that the starting point should 
not be to value trade secrets over freedom of expression, but to 
value the human right to information over information lock-down. 
The flourishing of individuals, society, and democracy depend 
upon it. 
